Douglas Thomas, Devolder Katrien
University of Oxford, UK.
Philos Q. 2021 Jun 5;72(2):305-325. doi: 10.1093/pq/pqab029. eCollection 2022 Apr.
Some suggest that gene editing human embryos to prevent genetic disorders will be in one respect morally preferable to using genetic selection for the same purpose: gene editing will benefit particular future persons, while genetic selection would merely replace them. We first construct the most plausible defence of this suggestion-the benefit argument-and defend it against a possible objection. We then advance another objection: the benefit argument succeeds only when restricted to cases in which the gene-edited child would have been brought into existence even if gene editing had not been employed. Our argument relies on a standard account of comparative benefit which has recently been criticised on the grounds that it succumbs to the so-called 'pre-emption problem'. We end by considering how our argument would be affected were the standard account revised in an attempt to evade this problem. We consider three revised accounts and argue that, on all three, our critique of the benefit argument stands.
一些人认为，为预防遗传疾病而对人类胚胎进行基因编辑，在某方面从道德上讲要优于出于同样目的进行基因选择：基因编辑将造福特定的未来个体，而基因选择仅仅是替换他们。我们首先构建对这一观点最合理的辩护——益处论证，并针对一个可能的反对意见为其辩护。然后我们提出另一个反对意见：益处论证只有在局限于即便未采用基因编辑该基因编辑儿童也会出生的情况下才成立。我们的论证依赖于一种关于比较益处的标准解释，该解释最近受到批评，理由是它屈服于所谓的“先占问题”。最后我们考虑，如果为规避这个问题而对标准解释进行修订，我们的论证会受到怎样的影响。我们考虑了三种修订后的解释，并论证在这三种解释下，我们对益处论证的批判都成立。
