Health Emergencies Programme, WHO, Geneva, Switzerland.
CPC Analytics, Berlin, Germany.
Lancet Glob Health. 2023 Jul;11(7):e1012-e1023. doi: 10.1016/S2214-109X(23)00198-5.
In May 2022, several countries with no history of sustained community transmission of mpox (formerly known as monkeypox) notified WHO of new mpox cases. These cases were soon followed by a large-scale outbreak, which unfolded across the world, driven by local, in-country transmission within previously unaffected countries. On July 23, 2022, WHO declared the outbreak a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. Here, we aim to describe the main epidemiological features of this outbreak, the largest reported to date.
In this analysis of global surveillance data we analysed data for all confirmed mpox cases reported by WHO Member States through the global surveillance system from Jan 1, 2022, to Jan 29, 2023. Data included daily aggregated numbers of mpox cases by country and a case reporting form (CRF) containing information on demographics, clinical presentation, epidemiological exposure factors, and laboratory testing. We used the data to (1) describe the key epidemiological and clinical features of cases; (2) analyse risk factors for hospitalisation (by multivariable mixed-effects binary logistic regression); and (3) retrospectively analyse transmission trends. Sequencing data from GISAID and GenBank were used to analyse monkeypox virus (MPXV) genetic diversity.
Data from 82 807 cases with submitted CRFs were included in the analysis. Cases were primarily due to clade IIb MPXV (mainly lineage B.1, followed by lineage A.2). The outbreak was driven by transmission among males (73 560 [96·4%] of 76 293 cases) who self-identify as men who have sex with men (25 938 [86·9%] of 29 854 cases). The most common reported route of transmission was sexual contact (14 941 [68·7%] of 21 749). 3927 (7·3%) of 54 117 cases were hospitalised, with increased odds for those aged younger than 5 years (adjusted odds ratio 2·12 [95% CI 1·32-3·40], p=0·0020), aged 65 years and older (1·54 [1·05-2·25], p=0·026), female cases (1·61 [1·35-1·91], p<0·0001), and for cases who are immunosuppressed either due to being HIV positive and immunosuppressed (2·00 [1·68-2·37], p<0·0001), or other immunocompromising conditions (3·47 [1·84-6·54], p=0·0001).
Continued global surveillance allowed WHO to monitor the epidemic, identify risk factors, and inform the public health response. The outbreak can be attributed to clade IIb MPXV spread by newly described modes of transmission.
WHO Contingency Fund for Emergencies.
For the French and Spanish translations of the abstract see Supplementary Materials section.
2022 年 5 月,一些从未有过猴痘(以前称为猴痘)社区持续传播的国家向世界卫生组织报告了新的猴痘病例。这些病例随后很快引发了一场大规模的暴发,在以前未受影响的国家中,由于当地的国内传播,该暴发在全球范围内蔓延。2022 年 7 月 23 日,世界卫生组织宣布该暴发为国际关注的突发公共卫生事件。在这里,我们旨在描述此次暴发的主要流行病学特征,这是迄今为止报告的最大规模暴发。
在对全球监测数据的这项分析中,我们分析了 2022 年 1 月 1 日至 2023 年 1 月 29 日期间,世界卫生组织会员国通过全球监测系统报告的所有确诊猴痘病例的全球监测数据。数据包括按国家和病例报告表(CRF)汇总的每日猴痘病例数,病例报告表包含人口统计学、临床特征、流行病学暴露因素和实验室检测信息。我们使用这些数据:(1)描述病例的主要流行病学和临床特征;(2)分析住院的危险因素(采用多变量混合效应二元逻辑回归);(3)回顾性分析传播趋势。从 GISAID 和 GenBank 获得的测序数据用于分析猴痘病毒(MPXV)的遗传多样性。
在分析中纳入了 82807 例有提交 CRF 的病例数据。这些病例主要是由 IIb 型猴痘病毒(主要是谱系 B.1,其次是谱系 A.2)引起的。此次暴发是由男性(76293 例中的 73560 例,占 96.4%)之间的传播引起的,这些男性自我认同为男男性行为者(29854 例中的 25938 例,占 86.9%)。最常见的报告传播途径是性接触(21749 例中的 14941 例,占 68.7%)。3927 例(7.3%)的病例住院治疗,年龄小于 5 岁的病例住院的可能性更高(调整后的优势比为 2.12[95%CI 1.32-3.40],p=0.0020),65 岁及以上(1.54[1.05-2.25],p=0.026),女性病例(1.61[1.35-1.91],p<0.0001),以及艾滋病毒阳性和免疫抑制的病例(2.00[1.68-2.37],p<0.0001)或其他免疫抑制情况(3.47[1.84-6.54],p=0.0001)。
持续的全球监测使世界卫生组织能够监测疫情、确定危险因素,并为公共卫生应对措施提供信息。此次暴发可归因于新描述的传播模式下 IIb 型猴痘病毒的传播。
世界卫生组织应急基金。
CONTINGENCY FUND FOR EMERGENCIES 应急基金。