Organizational Behavior Department, ESMT Berlin, 10178 Berlin, Germany.
Institute of Management and Organization, Leuphana University Lueneburg, 21335 Lueneburg, Germany.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2023 Aug 8;120(32):e2218582120. doi: 10.1073/pnas.2218582120. Epub 2023 Aug 1.
How low is the ideal first offer? Prior to any negotiation, decision-makers must balance a crucial tradeoff between two opposing effects. While lower first offers benefit buyers by anchoring the price in their favor, an overly ambitious offer increases the impasse risk, thus potentially precluding an agreement altogether. Past research with simulated laboratory or classroom exercises has demonstrated either a first offer's anchoring benefits its impasse risk detriments, while largely ignoring the other effect. In short, there is no empirical answer to the conundrum of how low an ideal first offer should be. Our results from over 26 million incentivized real-world negotiations on eBay document (a) a linear anchoring effect of buyer offers on sales price, (b) a nonlinear, quartic effect on impasse risk, and (c) specific offer values with particularly low impasse risks but high anchoring benefits. Integrating these findings suggests that the ideal buyer offer lies at 80% of the seller's list price across all products-although this value ranges from 33% to 95% depending on the type of product, demand, and buyers' weighting of price versus impasse risk. We empirically amend the well-known midpoint bias, the assumption that buyer and seller eventually meet in the middle of their opening offers, and find evidence for a "buyer bias." Product demand moderates the (non)linear effects, the ideal buyer offer, and the buyer bias. Finally, we apply machine learning analyses to predict impasses and present a website with customizable first-offer advice configured to different products, prices, and buyers' risk preferences.
首次报价的理想价位有多低？在进行任何谈判之前，决策者必须权衡两个相反因素之间的关键权衡。虽然较低的首次报价通过将价格锚定在对买家有利的位置来使买家受益，但过于雄心勃勃的报价会增加僵局风险，从而可能完全排除协议。过去在模拟实验室或课堂练习中的研究表明，首次报价的锚定效应及其僵局风险的损害，而在很大程度上忽略了另一种效应。简而言之，对于理想的首次报价应该多低这个难题，没有经验答案。我们在 eBay 上进行的超过 2600 万次激励性实际谈判的结果记录了（a）买家报价对销售价格的线性锚定效应，（b）僵局风险的非线性、四次方效应，以及（c）具有特别低僵局风险但高锚定收益的具体报价。整合这些发现表明，理想的买家报价位于卖家挂牌价的 80%——尽管这一数值因产品类型、需求以及买家对价格与僵局风险的重视程度而异，范围从 33%到 95%不等。我们从著名的中点偏差（即买家和卖家最终在他们的初始报价的中间相遇的假设）中进行了经验修正，并找到了“买家偏见”的证据。产品需求调节了（非）线性效应、理想的买家报价和买家偏见。最后，我们应用机器学习分析来预测僵局，并提供一个具有可定制首次报价建议的网站，该建议根据不同的产品、价格和买家的风险偏好进行配置。
