School of Business, East China University of Science and Technology, Shanghai, China.
PLoS One. 2023 Aug 25;18(8):e0284872. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0284872. eCollection 2023.
Government (especially local government) plays an important role in China's economic growth, the government is made up of officials, corporates are participants and the driving force of market economy, therefore, ignoring officials may not be able to directly explain the mechanism of corporate growth. This paper intends to discover how officials' promotion expectation may be beneficial for corporates-directly and/or indirectly via corporate strategic deviance-in terms of corporate growth. We conduct an empirical analysis of Chinese listed companies to test these arguments, the results show that officials' promotion expectation has a significantly positive impact on corporate growth; corporate strategic deviance has a mediating effect on the relationship between officials' promotion expectation and corporate growth; compared with non-state-owned enterprises, corporate strategic deviance has less influence on state-owned enterprises' growth. Our research generates a more comprehensive understanding of the political stakeholders-corporate growth relationship, provides direct evidence for the positive role of officials in corporate growth and expands the mediating research of corporate growth.
政府（尤其是地方政府）在中国的经济增长中扮演着重要的角色，政府由官员组成，企业是市场经济的参与者和驱动力，因此，忽视官员可能无法直接解释企业增长的机制。本文旨在探讨官员的晋升预期如何通过企业战略偏差（直接和/或间接）对企业增长产生有利影响。我们对中国上市公司进行了实证分析来检验这些论点，结果表明，官员的晋升预期对企业增长有显著的正向影响；企业战略偏差在官员晋升预期与企业增长之间存在中介效应；与非国有企业相比，企业战略偏差对国有企业的增长影响较小。我们的研究更全面地理解了政治利益相关者-企业增长的关系，为官员在企业增长中的积极作用提供了直接证据，并拓展了企业增长的中介研究。
