Department of Electronic Business, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou, China.
PLoS One. 2023 Oct 17;18(10):e0292736. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0292736. eCollection 2023.
This study investigates the decision process of own-brand intrusion by contract manufacturers and their selection of invasion sales modes under the consideration of service quality disparities between brand manufacturers and contract manufacturers. Specifically, the study constructs a three-tier supply chain system comprising a brand manufacturer, a contract manufacturer, and an e-commerce platform. The equilibrium profits under different sales mode combinations are determined by using reverse induction methodology, and the optimal sales mode combinations are analyzed and compared. The study reveals that the decision process of contract manufacturers' own-brand invasion depends on the potential market demand. Furthermore, when brand manufacturers adopt the reselling mode, the service quality level does not affect the decision process of invasion sales modes. However, when brand manufacturers adopt the agency mode, contract manufacturers with low service quality levels are more suitable for invasion through the agency mode, whereas contract manufacturers with high service quality levels are better suited for invasion through the reselling mode. Additionally, for the equilibrium sales mode combination among members of the supply chain, it is observed that with lower commission rates, both brand manufacturers and contract manufacturers choose the agency mode, while with higher commission rates, both choose the reselling mode. When commission rates are moderate, brand manufacturers prefer the agency mode, whereas contract manufacturers prefer the reselling mode.
本研究考察了合同制造商的自有品牌入侵决策过程以及他们在考虑品牌制造商和合同制造商之间服务质量差异的情况下对入侵销售模式的选择。具体来说，研究构建了一个由品牌制造商、合同制造商和电子商务平台组成的三层供应链系统。通过反推法确定了不同销售模式组合下的均衡利润，并对最优销售模式组合进行了分析和比较。研究表明，合同制造商自有品牌入侵的决策过程取决于潜在的市场需求。此外，当品牌制造商采用转售模式时，服务质量水平不影响入侵销售模式的决策过程。然而，当品牌制造商采用代理模式时，服务质量水平较低的合同制造商更适合通过代理模式进行入侵，而服务质量水平较高的合同制造商则更适合通过转售模式进行入侵。此外，对于供应链成员之间的均衡销售模式组合，观察到随着佣金率的降低，品牌制造商和合同制造商都选择代理模式，而随着佣金率的提高，两者都选择转售模式。当佣金率适中时，品牌制造商更喜欢代理模式，而合同制造商更喜欢转售模式。
