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考虑环境影响和 WEEE 法规下销售合作的电子商务平台闭环供应链的最优决策。

Optimal Decision-Making of Closed-Loop Supply Chains in E-Commerce Platform Considering Sales Cooperations under Environmental Effects and WEEE Regulations.

机构信息

College of Management Science, Chengdu University of Technology, Chengdu 610059, China.

Southwest Jiaotong University Hope College, Chengdu 610400, China.

出版信息

Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2023 May 4;20(9):5724. doi: 10.3390/ijerph20095724.

DOI:10.3390/ijerph20095724
PMID:37174242
原文链接:https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10178386/
Abstract

Nowadays, to achieve carbon neutrality, e-commerce platforms participate in the sales and recycling of electrical and electronic products in consideration of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) regulations and environmental effects. This study builds a Stackelberg game model for an e-commerce closed-loop supply chain (ECLSC) under different sales cooperation modes between a manufacturer of electrical and electronic products and an e-commerce platform. Reverse induction is used to obtain the optimal decision-making and profit of the ECLSC under three sales cooperation modes, considering the influence of environmental effects on optimal decision and objective functions. The results show the following: the sales cooperation mode and environmental cost do not affect the WEEE recovery prices of manufacturers and e-commerce platforms, nor do they affect government subsidy standards for dismantling WEEEs; they are, however, positively correlated with environmental benefits. Furthermore, the wholesale and retail prices of electrical and electronic products under different sales cooperation modes are related to sales cooperation modes and environmental costs. Moreover, the processing fees imposed on the manufacturers are related to the environmental costs of the electrical and electronic products; the thresholds of environmental costs of products for government to levy processing fees are different under different sales cooperation modes. Finally, the environmental cost of products required by the government's levying of processing fees are the lowest under a hybrid model. Generally speaking, under WEEE regulations, governments should levy more processing fees for electrical and electronic products with higher environmental costs. Meanwhile, increased environmental benefits will always increase the profits of supply chain members, but increased environmental costs do not always reduce the profits of supply chain members, and multichannel product sales do not always generate profits for manufacturers.

摘要

如今,为了实现碳中和,电子商务平台考虑到废弃电气电子设备(WEEE)法规和环境影响,参与到电气电子产品的销售和回收中。本研究构建了不同销售合作模式下电气电子产品制造商和电子商务平台之间的电子商务闭环供应链(ECLSC)的Stackelberg 博弈模型。考虑环境效应对最优决策和目标函数的影响,采用逆推归纳法得到了三种销售合作模式下 ECLSC 的最优决策和利润。结果表明:销售合作模式和环境成本既不影响制造商和电子商务平台的 WEEE 回收率,也不影响政府对 WEEE 拆解的补贴标准;但它们与环境效益呈正相关。此外,不同销售合作模式下电气电子产品的批发和零售价格与销售合作模式和环境成本有关。而且,对制造商征收的加工费与电气电子产品的环境成本有关;在不同的销售合作模式下,政府对产品征收加工费的环境成本阈值不同。最后,在混合模式下,政府征收加工费所需的产品环境成本最低。一般来说,在 WEEE 法规下,政府应该对环境成本较高的电气电子产品征收更多的加工费。同时,增加环境效益将始终增加供应链成员的利润,但增加环境成本并不总是降低供应链成员的利润,多渠道产品销售并不总是为制造商带来利润。

https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/dc9b/10178386/9e4e613c5bd2/ijerph-20-05724-g012.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/dc9b/10178386/15661a0d6d6a/ijerph-20-05724-g0A1.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/dc9b/10178386/5bf16f506000/ijerph-20-05724-g0A2.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/dc9b/10178386/cbe0341edf8c/ijerph-20-05724-g0A3.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/dc9b/10178386/b0edbba0af98/ijerph-20-05724-g001.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/dc9b/10178386/7207ace253b3/ijerph-20-05724-g002.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/dc9b/10178386/a784554331cf/ijerph-20-05724-g003.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/dc9b/10178386/aad5d8f92d22/ijerph-20-05724-g004.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/dc9b/10178386/7d9221d5d563/ijerph-20-05724-g005.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/dc9b/10178386/64d656b81dde/ijerph-20-05724-g006.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/dc9b/10178386/5e07da378c90/ijerph-20-05724-g007.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/dc9b/10178386/fc9a1702cc85/ijerph-20-05724-g008.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/dc9b/10178386/60f5dd568845/ijerph-20-05724-g009.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/dc9b/10178386/c33fd01309f3/ijerph-20-05724-g010.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/dc9b/10178386/656a5c29f74c/ijerph-20-05724-g011.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/dc9b/10178386/9e4e613c5bd2/ijerph-20-05724-g012.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/dc9b/10178386/15661a0d6d6a/ijerph-20-05724-g0A1.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/dc9b/10178386/5bf16f506000/ijerph-20-05724-g0A2.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/dc9b/10178386/cbe0341edf8c/ijerph-20-05724-g0A3.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/dc9b/10178386/b0edbba0af98/ijerph-20-05724-g001.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/dc9b/10178386/7207ace253b3/ijerph-20-05724-g002.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/dc9b/10178386/a784554331cf/ijerph-20-05724-g003.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/dc9b/10178386/aad5d8f92d22/ijerph-20-05724-g004.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/dc9b/10178386/7d9221d5d563/ijerph-20-05724-g005.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/dc9b/10178386/64d656b81dde/ijerph-20-05724-g006.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/dc9b/10178386/5e07da378c90/ijerph-20-05724-g007.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/dc9b/10178386/fc9a1702cc85/ijerph-20-05724-g008.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/dc9b/10178386/60f5dd568845/ijerph-20-05724-g009.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/dc9b/10178386/c33fd01309f3/ijerph-20-05724-g010.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/dc9b/10178386/656a5c29f74c/ijerph-20-05724-g011.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/dc9b/10178386/9e4e613c5bd2/ijerph-20-05724-g012.jpg

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