Kernell Georgia, Lamberson P J
Departments of Communication and Political Science, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, USA.
Department of Communication, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, USA.
R Soc Open Sci. 2023 Oct 18;10(10):230704. doi: 10.1098/rsos.230704. eCollection 2023 Oct.
This paper develops a model of voter turnout that embeds Riker and Ordeshook's (1968 , 25-42 (doi:10.2307/1953324)) calculus of voting into the context of a social network. In the model, an individual's expressive benefits to voting depend on the behaviour of their social contacts. We show that there may be multiple equilibria and analyse how these equilibria depend on the structure of the network. We discuss six empirical implications of the model for turnout, some of which suggest novel answers to longstanding puzzles in the turnout literature, such as: why are higher income individuals more likely to vote even in cases when registration costs are low? Why is turnout so difficult to predict? Why does lowering registration costs disproportionately increase turnout among high-income voters? And why do we observe inertia in turnout across elections?
本文构建了一个选民投票率模型，该模型将赖克和奥德舒克（1968年，第25 - 42页，doi:10.2307/1953324）的投票计算法置于社会网络背景之中。在该模型中，个体投票所带来的表达性收益取决于其社会关系人的行为。我们表明，可能存在多个均衡，并分析这些均衡如何依赖于网络结构。我们讨论了该模型对投票率的六个实证意义，其中一些为投票率文献中长期存在的谜题提供了新颖的答案，比如：为什么即使在登记成本很低的情况下，高收入个体投票的可能性也更高？为什么投票率如此难以预测？为什么降低登记成本会使高收入选民的投票率不成比例地增加？以及为什么我们会观察到选举中的投票率存在惯性？
