Xie Lei, Hou Pengwen, Han Hongshuai
School of Management, Shandong University, Jinan 250100, China.
Coordinated Innovation Center for Computable Modeling in Management Science, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, China.
Transp Res E Logist Transp Rev. 2021 Feb;146:102220. doi: 10.1016/j.tre.2020.102220. Epub 2021 Jan 17.
This paper analyses the choice of subsidy offered to a vaccine supply chain with a risk-averse buyer. We find that for a higher innovation effort and level of social benefits, the per-unit production subsidy is better when there is a low innovation cost coefficient, a low level of risk aversion, or a high potential demand. Otherwise, under the opposite conditions, the R&D innovation effort subsidy should be selected. Furthermore, from an evolutionary game theoretical perspective, we also present the stability performance for the subsidies, and the results show that when the manufacturer's innovation cost coefficient is relatively low, the more profitable per-unit production subsidy may be abandoned due to its performance instability.
本文分析了向具有风险规避型买家的疫苗供应链提供补贴的选择。我们发现，对于更高的创新努力和社会效益水平，当创新成本系数较低、风险规避水平较低或潜在需求较高时，单位生产补贴更好。否则，在相反的条件下，应选择研发创新努力补贴。此外，从演化博弈论的角度，我们还给出了补贴的稳定性表现，结果表明，当制造商的创新成本系数相对较低时，单位生产补贴因其表现不稳定可能会被放弃，尽管其利润更高。
