School of Economics and Management, Huaibei Normal University, Huaibei, China.
Center for Industrial and Business Organization, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian, China.
Front Public Health. 2024 Jan 5;11:1320072. doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2023.1320072. eCollection 2023.
Local governments have been captured by enterprises and, thus, have relaxed environmental regulations. This phenomenon has occurred repeatedly and has resulted in serious environmental pollution, posing an enormous threat to public health. To solve this problem, this study introduces central environmental protection inspection and media supervision and considers the economic preferences and environmental preferences of local governments. A four-party evolutionary game model composed of enterprises, local governments, the central government and the media is constructed, and the equilibrium solution of four-party replicator dynamics equations is obtained. The influence of relevant parameters on the choice of strategies of the four main bodies is simulated by using MATLAB software to explore the paths and measures for overcoming regulatory capture and to further improve the modern environmental governance system. The results show the following: First, local governments are easily captured by large enterprises. Second, the central government can improve the environmental behavior of local governments by reducing their economic preferences and strengthening punishment. Third, compared to the penalties imposed by the central government, those imposed by local governments have a more significant impact on the environmental behaviors of enterprises. Fourth, compared to the use of an environmental protection tax policy or a tax relief policy alone, the combination of the two has a more significant impact on the environmental behaviors of enterprises. Fifth, central environmental protection inspection and media supervision can improve the environmental behaviors of both local governments and enterprises, and the effect of media supervision is better than that of central environmental protection inspection. This study recommends improving the performance evaluation system for local governments to coordinate economic development and environmental protection, ensuring that local governments assume the main responsibility, using a combination of incentive and constraint policies for enterprises, and increasing the environmental protection inspection and media supervision of local governments and enterprises to resolve the dilemma of regulatory capture in environmental pollution through the simultaneous enhancement of the environmental behavior of local governments and enterprises.
地方政府被企业所俘获，从而放松了环境监管。这种现象屡屡发生，导致了严重的环境污染，对公众健康构成了巨大威胁。为了解决这个问题，本研究引入了中央环保督察和媒体监督，并考虑了地方政府的经济偏好和环境偏好。构建了由企业、地方政府、中央政府和媒体组成的四方演化博弈模型，得到了四方复制动态方程的平衡点解。利用 MATLAB 软件模拟相关参数对四方主体策略选择的影响，探讨了克服监管俘获、进一步完善现代环境治理体系的路径和措施。结果表明：第一，地方政府容易被大企业俘获；第二，中央政府可以通过降低经济偏好和加强处罚来提高地方政府的环境行为；第三，与中央政府的处罚相比，地方政府的处罚对企业的环境行为有更显著的影响；第四，与单独使用环保税政策或税收减免政策相比，两者结合对企业的环境行为有更显著的影响；第五，中央环保督察和媒体监督可以提高地方政府和企业的环境行为，媒体监督的效果优于中央环保督察。本研究建议完善地方政府的绩效考核体系，协调经济发展与环境保护，确保地方政府承担主要责任，对企业采用激励与约束政策相结合的方式，并加强对地方政府和企业的环保督察和媒体监督，通过同时提高地方政府和企业的环境行为，解决环境污染中的监管俘获困境。
