School of Business, Shandong Normal University, Ji'nan, China.
Quality Research Center, Shandong Normal University, Ji'nan, China.
Front Public Health. 2022 Apr 29;10:858705. doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2022.858705. eCollection 2022.
The efficiency and level of drug quality supervision are highly related to the distorted or true reporting of new media, and the collusion or non-collusion of third-party testing agencies. Therefore, based on the co-regulation information platform, considering the strategic choices of local government, drug enterprises, third-party testing agencies and new media, this article constructs a four-party evolutionary game model of co-regulation supervision. The stable equilibrium points of each participant's strategic choices are solved. The stability of the strategic combination is analyzed by first , and is used for simulation analysis to verify the influence of each decision variable on different players' strategic choices. The results show that, firstly, new media's true reporting can make up for the lack of supervision of drug enterprises by local government, and the greater the impact of new media reporting, the more active drug enterprises will be to produce high-quality drugs. Secondly, non-collusion of third-party testing agencies can improve the self-discipline ability of drug enterprises, encourage new media to report truthfully, and play the role of co-regulation supervision. Furthermore, the greater the probability of new media's true reporting, the more local government tend to be stricter, and the probability of strict supervision is positively related to the central government's accountability. Finally, increasing penalty for producing low-quality drugs and collusion will help standardize the behavior of drug enterprises and third-party testing agencies. This article enriches and expands the theoretical basis of the drug quality co-regulation supervision and proposes corresponding countermeasures and suggestions.
药品质量监管的效率和水平与新媒体的失真或真实报告、第三方检测机构的勾结或不勾结高度相关。因此，基于共治信息平台，考虑地方政府、药品企业、第三方检测机构和新媒体的战略选择，本文构建了共治监管的四方演化博弈模型。求解了各参与方战略选择的稳定平衡点，通过雅克比矩阵分析了稳定性，运用数值仿真分析验证了各决策变量对不同参与者战略选择的影响。结果表明，首先，新媒体的真实报道可以弥补地方政府对药品企业监管的不足，新媒体报道的影响力越大，药品企业生产高质量药品的积极性就越高。其次，第三方检测机构不勾结可以提高药品企业的自律能力，鼓励新媒体真实报道，发挥共治监管作用。此外，新媒体真实报道的概率越大，地方政府越倾向于严格监管，严格监管的概率与中央政府的问责制呈正相关。最后，加大对生产低质量药品和勾结行为的处罚力度，有助于规范药品企业和第三方检测机构的行为。本文丰富和扩展了药品质量共治监管的理论基础，并提出了相应的对策建议。
