Le Besnerais Alexis, Moore James W, Berberian Bruno, Grynszpan Ouriel
Information Processing and Systems, Office National d'Etudes et Recherches Aérospatiales, Salon de Provence, France.
Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire des Sciences du Numérique, CNRS, Université Paris-Saclay, Orsay, France.
Front Psychol. 2024 Jan 31;15:1331084. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1331084. eCollection 2024.
The sense of agency refers to the experience of control over voluntary actions and their effects. There is growing interest in the notion of we-agency, whereby individual sense of agency is supplanted by a collective agentic experience. The existence of this unique agentic state would have profound implications for human responsibility, and, as such, warrants further scrutiny. In this paper, we review the concept of we-agency and examine whether evidence supports it. We argue that this concept entails multiplying hypothetical agentic states associated with joint action, thus ending up with an entangled phenomenology that appears somewhat speculative when weighted against the available evidence. In light of this, we suggest that the concept of we-agency should be abandoned in favor of a more parsimonious framework for the sense of agency in joint action.
行动感是指对自愿行动及其效果的控制体验。人们对“我们的行动”这一概念越来越感兴趣,在这种概念中,个体的行动感被一种集体行动体验所取代。这种独特行动状态的存在将对人类责任产生深远影响,因此值得进一步审视。在本文中,我们回顾了“我们的行动”这一概念,并研究证据是否支持它。我们认为,这一概念需要增加与联合行动相关的假设行动状态,从而导致一种纠缠不清的现象学,根据现有证据来看,这种现象学似乎有些推测性。有鉴于此,我们建议放弃“我们的行动”这一概念,转而采用一个更简洁的联合行动行动感框架。