Division of Infection Control, Department of Virology, Norwegian Institute of Public Health, PO Box 222 Skøyen, 0213, Oslo, Norway.
Division of Infection Control, Department of Vaccines, Norwegian Institute of Public Health, PO Box 222 Skøyen, 0213, Oslo, Norway.
Virol J. 2024 Mar 6;21(1):57. doi: 10.1186/s12985-024-02326-w.
Non-pharmaceutical interventions implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in a marked reduction in influenza infections globally. The absence of influenza has raised concerns of waning immunity, and potentially more severe influenza seasons after the pandemic.
To evaluate immunity towards influenza post-COVID-19 pandemic we have assessed influenza A epidemics in Norway from October 2016 to June 2023 and measured antibodies against circulating strains of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and A(H3N2) in different age groups by hemagglutination inhibition (HAI) assays in a total of 3364 serum samples collected in 2019, 2021, 2022 and 2023.
Influenza epidemics in Norway from October 2016 until June 2023 were predominately influenza As, with a mixture of A(H1N1)pdm09 and A(H3N2) subtype predominance. We did not observe higher numbers of infections during the influenza epidemics following the COVID-19 pandemic than in pre-COVID-19 seasons. Frequencies of protective HAI titers against A(H1N1)pdm09 and A(H3N2) viruses were reduced in sera collected in 2021 and 2022, compared to sera collected in 2019. The reduction could, however, largely be explained by antigenic drift of new virus strains, as protective HAI titers remained stable against the same strain from one season to the next. However, we observed the development of an immunity gap in the youngest children during the pandemic which resulted in a prominent reduction in HAI titers against A(H1N1)pdm09 in 2021 and 2022. The immunity gap was partially closed in sera collected in 2023 following the A(H1N1)pdm09-dominated influenza seasons of 2022/2023. During the 2022/2023 epidemic, drift variants of A(H1N1)pdm09 belonging to the 5a.2a.1 clade emerged, and pre-season HAI titers were significantly lower against this clade compared to the ancestral 5a.2 clade.
The observed reduction in protective antibodies against A(H1N1)pdm09 and A(H3N2) viruses post COVID-19 is best explained by antigenic drift of emerging viruses, and not waning of antibody responses in the general population. However, the absence of influenza during the pandemic resulted in an immunity gap in the youngest children. While this immunity gap was partially closed following the 2022/2023 influenza season, children with elevated risk of severe infection should be prioritized for vaccination.
COVID-19 大流行期间实施的非药物干预措施导致全球流感感染显著减少。流感的缺席引发了人们对免疫减弱的担忧,并有可能在大流行后出现更严重的流感季节。
为了评估 COVID-19 大流行后对流感的免疫,我们评估了 2016 年 10 月至 2023 年 6 月期间挪威的流感疫情,并通过血凝抑制 (HAI) 测定法在不同年龄组中测量了针对循环流感 A 株的抗体(A(H1N1)pdm09 和 A(H3N2))在总共 3364 份血清样本中,这些样本于 2019 年、2021 年、2022 年和 2023 年采集。
2016 年 10 月至 2023 年 6 月期间,挪威的流感疫情主要是 A 型流感,其中 A(H1N1)pdm09 和 A(H3N2)亚型混合存在。我们没有观察到 COVID-19 大流行后流感疫情期间的感染人数比大流行前季节更多。与 2019 年采集的血清相比,2021 年和 2022 年采集的血清中针对 A(H1N1)pdm09 和 A(H3N2)病毒的保护性 HAI 滴度降低。然而,这种降低在很大程度上可以用新病毒株的抗原漂移来解释,因为针对同一病毒株的保护性 HAI 滴度在一个季节到下一个季节保持稳定。然而,我们在疫情期间观察到最年轻的儿童中出现了免疫空白,这导致 2021 年和 2022 年针对 A(H1N1)pdm09 的 HAI 滴度显著降低。在 2022/2023 年 A(H1N1)pdm09 主导的流感季节之后,这种免疫空白在 2023 年采集的血清中部分得到了填补。在 2022/2023 年疫情期间,出现了属于 5a.2a.1 分支的 A(H1N1)pdm09 漂移变体,并且针对该分支的 preseason HAI 滴度明显低于原始 5a.2 分支。
与 COVID-19 后针对 A(H1N1)pdm09 和 A(H3N2)病毒的保护性抗体的观察到的降低情况相比,最好通过新兴病毒的抗原漂移来解释,而不是人群中抗体反应的减弱。然而,大流行期间流感的缺席导致了最年轻儿童的免疫空白。虽然在 2022/2023 年流感季节之后,这种免疫空白得到了部分填补,但应优先为感染风险高的儿童接种疫苗。