Sheffield Centre for Health and Related Research (SCHARR), Division of Population Health, School of Medicine and Population Health, The University of Sheffield, Regent Court, 30 Regent Street, Sheffield, S1 4DA, UK.
Centre for Health Economics (CHE), University of York, Heslington, York, YO10 5DD, UK.
Appl Health Econ Health Policy. 2024 Jul;22(4):435-445. doi: 10.1007/s40258-024-00875-3. Epub 2024 Mar 11.
Commissioning describes the process of contracting appropriate care services to address pre-identified needs through pre-agreed payment structures. Outcomes-based commissioning (i.e., paying services for pre-agreed outcomes) shares a common goal with economic evaluation: achieving value for money for relevant outcomes (e.g., health) achieved from a finite budget. We describe considerations and challenges as to the practical role of relevant outcomes for evaluation and commissioning, seeking to bridge a gap between economic evaluation evidence and care commissioning. We describe conceptual (e.g., what are 'relevant' outcomes) alongside practical considerations (e.g., quantifying and using relevant endpoint or surrogate outcomes) and pertinent issues when linking outcomes to commissioning-based payment mechanisms, using England as a case study. Economic evaluation often focuses on a single endpoint health-focused maximand, e.g., quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs), whereas commissioning often focuses on activity-based surrogate outcomes (e.g., health monitoring), as easier-to-measure key performance indicators that are more acceptable (e.g., by clinicians) and amenable to being linked with payment structures. However, payments linked to endpoint and/or surrogate outcomes can lead to market inefficiencies; for example, when surrogates do not have the intended causal effect on endpoint outcomes or when service activity focuses on only people who can achieve prespecified payment-linked outcomes. Accounting for and explaining direct links from commissioners' payment structures to surrogate and then endpoint economic outcomes is a vital step to bridging a gap between economic evaluation approaches and commissioning. Decision-analytic models could aid this but they must be designed to account for relevant surrogate and endpoint outcomes, the payments assigned to such outcomes, and their interaction with the system commissioners purport to influence.
委托描述了通过预先商定的支付结构来承包适当的护理服务以满足预先确定的需求的过程。基于结果的委托(即,为预先商定的结果支付服务费用)与经济评估有共同的目标:在有限的预算内实现相关结果(例如,健康)的物有所值。我们描述了与评估和委托相关的实际结果的作用的考虑因素和挑战,旨在弥合经济评估证据与护理委托之间的差距。我们描述了概念性的考虑因素(例如,什么是“相关”结果)以及实际考虑因素(例如,量化和使用相关的终点或替代结果),以及当将结果与基于委托的支付机制联系起来时的相关问题,以英格兰作为案例研究。经济评估通常侧重于单个终点健康重点的最大化,例如,质量调整生命年(QALYs),而委托通常侧重于基于活动的替代结果(例如,健康监测),因为这些结果更容易测量,是更可接受的(例如,由临床医生),并且可以与支付结构联系起来。然而,与终点和/或替代结果相关的支付可能会导致市场效率低下;例如,当替代结果对终点结果没有预期的因果影响时,或者当服务活动仅关注那些能够实现预定支付相关结果的人时。解释和解释从委员会的支付结构到替代结果,然后到终点经济结果的直接联系是弥合经济评估方法和委托之间差距的重要步骤。决策分析模型可以为此提供帮助,但它们必须设计为考虑相关的替代和终点结果、分配给这些结果的支付以及它们与系统委员会试图影响的相互作用。