School of Intellectual Property, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, No. 200 Xiaolingwei Street, Xuanwu District, Nanjing 210094, China.
Centre for Innovation and Development, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing 210094, China.
Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2023 Feb 12;20(4):3217. doi: 10.3390/ijerph20043217.
In an effort to tackle climate change, the "Dual Carbon" target raised by the Chinese government aims to reach peak carbon dioxide emissions by 2030 and to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. Accordingly, policy incentives have accelerated the new energy vehicle (NEV) sector. Whilst previous studies have focused on the bilateral game between governments and manufacturers, NEV development has witnessed interaction among multiple players. In this paper, we construct a quadrilateral evolutionary game model, considering the impact of government policies, manufacturers' R&D investments, dealers' support, and consumer choice on the evolutionary stabilization strategy (ESS) in the context of China. The results show that: (1) in the absence of government incentives, there is no motivation for manufacturers, dealers and consumers to consider the development of NEVs; (2) government incentives affect manufacturers and consumers on the evolutionary paths in the short term. In the long term, benefit- and utility-based limited rationality has a dominant role in the ESS. This study contributes to the understanding of the multilateral dynamics of NEV innovation and provides important implications to practitioners and policy makers.
为应对气候变化，中国政府提出的“双碳”目标旨在 2030 年前实现二氧化碳排放峰值，2060 年前实现碳中和。相应地，政策激励措施加速了新能源汽车（NEV）行业的发展。虽然先前的研究集中在政府和制造商之间的双边博弈上，但 NEV 的发展见证了多方参与者之间的互动。在本文中，我们构建了一个四边形进化博弈模型，考虑了政府政策、制造商研发投资、经销商支持和消费者选择对中国背景下的进化稳定策略（ESS）的影响。结果表明：（1）在没有政府激励的情况下，制造商、经销商和消费者没有动力考虑发展新能源汽车；（2）政府激励措施在短期内影响制造商和消费者的进化路径。从长期来看，基于利益和效用的有限理性在 ESS 中占主导地位。本研究有助于理解新能源汽车创新的多边动态，并为从业者和政策制定者提供重要启示。
