Tang Jinhuan, Wu Qiong
School of Economics and Management, Shenyang Aerospace University, Shenyang, 110136, China.
Heliyon. 2024 Mar 16;10(6):e27711. doi: 10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e27711. eCollection 2024 Mar 30.
New energy vehicles (NEVs) are crucial way to solving environmental and energy dilemmas. However, the transition from traditional energy vehicles (TEVs) to NEVs is extremely intricate. If the process for TEVs switching to NEVs falls into out order, the automobile industry will be shaken. This paper takes electric vehicles (EVs), representing NEVs, and internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs), representing TEVs, as research objects, and constructs a dynamic Gounod duopoly model for the production decisions of two oligopolistic automakers under the dual credit policy. Combining the nonlinear dynamic theory and Cournot game, the influence of policy, market, technology, and cost on the stability of duopoly automakers' dynamic production game equilibrium and the nonlinear evolution characteristics of Cournot-Nash equilibrium are analyzed systematically. Results show that: (1) In the transition from ICEVs to EVs, if the speed of production adjustment is too fast, the automobile system would trap into chaos and shakeouts, and the social welfare would show volatility. (2) The revised dual credit policy increases the credit ratio and decreases the credit coefficient which enhances the stability of automobile system. This revision may accelerate the transformation from ICEVs to EVs in the automobile industry. Especially, the credit coefficient plays a more significant role. (3) The consumer acceptance for vehicle prices and the range of EV are positively correlated with the production of EVs and the social welfare, and negatively correlated with the production of ICEVs. Nevertheless, the cost of the two types of vehicle had the opposite effect compared price acceptance and range of EVs.
新能源汽车是解决环境和能源困境的关键途径。然而，从传统能源汽车向新能源汽车的转型极其复杂。如果传统能源汽车向新能源汽车的转换过程陷入混乱，汽车行业将受到冲击。本文以代表新能源汽车的电动汽车和代表传统能源汽车的内燃机汽车为研究对象，构建了双积分政策下两家寡头汽车制造商生产决策的动态古诺双寡头模型。结合非线性动力学理论和古诺博弈，系统分析了政策、市场、技术和成本对双寡头汽车制造商动态生产博弈均衡稳定性的影响以及古诺-纳什均衡的非线性演化特征。结果表明：（1）在内燃机汽车向电动汽车的转型过程中，如果生产调整速度过快，汽车系统将陷入混乱和淘汰，社会福利将出现波动。（2）修订后的双积分政策提高了积分比例，降低了积分系数，增强了汽车系统的稳定性。这一修订可能会加速汽车行业从内燃机汽车向电动汽车的转型。特别是，积分系数起着更为显著的作用。（3）消费者对车辆价格和电动汽车续航里程的接受程度与电动汽车产量和社会福利呈正相关，与内燃机汽车产量呈负相关。然而，两类车辆的成本与电动汽车价格接受程度和续航里程的影响相反。
