Management School, Harbin University of Commerce, Harbin, China.
Front Public Health. 2024 Apr 2;12:1373747. doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2024.1373747. eCollection 2024.
The quality and safety of agricultural products are related to people's lives and health, economic development, and social stability, and have always been a hot issue of concern to the government and society. The rapid development of digital traceability technology in the digital environment has brought new opportunities for the supervision of agricultural product quality and safety, but the frequent occurrence of agricultural product safety incidents in recent years has exposed many problems such as the lack of governmental supervision, unstandardized production process of enterprises, and weak consumer awareness. To improve the cooperation efficiency of stakeholders and ensure the quality and safety of agricultural products, this paper proposes a dynamic model based on evolutionary game theory. The model incorporates the government, agricultural product producers, and farmers, and evaluates the stability and effectiveness of the system under different circumstances. The results of the study show that there are multiple evolutionary stabilization strategies in the tripartite evolutionary game model of agricultural product quality and safety supervision, and there are corresponding evolutionary stabilization conditions. There are several factors affecting the stability of the system, the most important of which are government regulation, severe penalties for agricultural product producers, and incentives. When these factors reach a certain threshold, the stakeholder cooperation mechanism can establish an evolutionarily stable strategy. This study contributes to the understanding of the operational mechanism of stakeholder cooperation in agricultural product quality and safety regulation in the digital environment and provides decision support and policy recommendations for stakeholders to promote the sustainable development and optimization of agricultural product quality and safety regulation.
农产品的质量和安全关系到人们的生活和健康、经济发展和社会稳定,一直是政府和社会关注的热点问题。数字环境中快速发展的农产品质量安全追溯技术为农产品质量安全监管带来了新的机遇,但近年来农产品安全事件频发,暴露出政府监管缺失、企业生产流程不规范、消费者意识薄弱等诸多问题。为了提高利益相关者的合作效率,确保农产品的质量和安全,本文提出了一个基于进化博弈论的动态模型。该模型纳入了政府、农产品生产者和农民,并在不同情况下评估了系统的稳定性和有效性。研究结果表明,农产品质量安全监管三方进化博弈模型存在多个进化稳定策略,存在相应的进化稳定条件。有几个因素会影响系统的稳定性,其中最重要的是政府监管、对农产品生产者的严厉处罚和激励措施。当这些因素达到一定阈值时,利益相关者合作机制就可以建立一个进化稳定策略。本研究有助于理解数字环境中农产品质量安全监管中利益相关者合作的运作机制,为利益相关者提供决策支持和政策建议,以促进农产品质量安全监管的可持续发展和优化。