Wahn Basil, Schmitz Laura
Institute of Educational Research, Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany.
Department of Cognitive Psychology and Ergonomics, Technische Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany.
Cogn Res Princ Implic. 2024 Apr 23;9(1):24. doi: 10.1186/s41235-024-00550-0.
With the increased sophistication of technology, humans have the possibility to offload a variety of tasks to algorithms. Here, we investigated whether the extent to which people are willing to offload an attentionally demanding task to an algorithm is modulated by the availability of a bonus task and by the knowledge about the algorithm's capacity. Participants performed a multiple object tracking (MOT) task which required them to visually track targets on a screen. Participants could offload an unlimited number of targets to a "computer partner". If participants decided to offload the entire task to the computer, they could instead perform a bonus task which resulted in additional financial gain-however, this gain was conditional on a high performance accuracy in the MOT task. Thus, participants should only offload the entire task if they trusted the computer to perform accurately. We found that participants were significantly more willing to completely offload the task if they were informed beforehand that the computer's accuracy was flawless (Experiment 1 vs. 2). Participants' offloading behavior was not significantly affected by whether the bonus task was incentivized or not (Experiment 2 vs. 3). These results combined with those from our previous study (Wahn et al. in PLoS ONE 18:e0286102, 2023), which did not include a bonus task but was identical otherwise, show that the human willingness to offload an attentionally demanding task to an algorithm is considerably boosted by the availability of a bonus task-even if not incentivized-and by the knowledge about the algorithm's capacity.
随着技术日益复杂,人类有可能将各种任务交给算法处理。在此,我们研究了人们将一项需要高度注意力的任务交给算法的意愿程度,是否会受到奖励任务的可用性以及对算法能力的了解的调节。参与者执行了一项多目标跟踪(MOT)任务,要求他们在屏幕上视觉跟踪目标。参与者可以将不限数量的目标交给“计算机伙伴”。如果参与者决定将整个任务交给计算机,他们可以转而执行一项奖励任务,从而获得额外的经济收益——然而,这种收益取决于在MOT任务中的高绩效准确性。因此,参与者只有在信任计算机能准确执行任务时,才会将整个任务交托出去。我们发现,如果事先告知参与者计算机的准确性毫无瑕疵,他们会明显更愿意完全交托任务(实验1与实验2对比)。奖励任务是否有激励措施对参与者的交托行为没有显著影响(实验2与实验3对比)。这些结果与我们之前的研究(瓦恩等人,发表于《公共科学图书馆·综合》,2023年,第18卷,e0286102)相结合,该研究未包含奖励任务,但在其他方面相同,结果表明,即使没有激励措施,奖励任务的可用性以及对算法能力的了解,会显著提高人类将需要高度注意力的任务交给算法的意愿。