Department of Philosophy, Social Sciences and Education, University of Perugia, Via dell'Università 1, 06123, Perugia, Italy.
Underwood International College, Yonsei University, 50 Yonsei-ro, Seodaemun-gu, 03722, Seoul, Republic of Korea.
Stud Hist Philos Sci. 2024 Oct;107:1-10. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.07.005. Epub 2024 Aug 5.
We propose that the epistemic functions of replication in science are best understood by relating them to kinds of experimental error/uncertainty. One kind of replication, which we call "direct replications," principally serves to assess the reliability of an experiment through its precision: the presence and degree of random error/statistical uncertainty. The other kind of replication, which we call "conceptual replications," principally serves to assess the validity of an experiment through its accuracy: the presence and degree of systematic errors/uncertainties. To illustrate the aptness of this general view, we examine the Hubble constant controversy in astronomy, showing how astronomers have responded to the concordances and discordances in their results by carrying out the different kinds of replication that we identify, with the aim of establishing a precise, accurate value for the Hubble constant. We contrast our view with Machery's "re-sampling" account of replication, which maintains that replications only assess reliability.
我们提出，通过将复制的认识论功能与实验误差/不确定性的种类联系起来，可以更好地理解科学中的复制的认识论功能。我们称之为“直接复制”的一种复制主要通过其精度来评估实验的可靠性：随机误差/统计不确定性的存在和程度。我们称之为“概念复制”的另一种复制主要通过其准确性来评估实验的有效性：系统误差/不确定性的存在和程度。为了说明这种一般观点的恰当性，我们考察了天文学中的哈勃常数争议，展示了天文学家如何通过进行我们所确定的不同类型的复制来应对他们的结果中的一致性和不一致性，目的是为哈勃常数建立一个精确、准确的值。我们将我们的观点与马切里的“重新采样”复制理论进行了对比，后者认为复制只能评估可靠性。
