Gómez Eduardo J
Lehigh University.
J Health Polit Policy Law. 2025 Feb 1;50(1):69-101. doi: 10.1215/03616878-11513070.
Little is known about the political, institutional, and social contexts contributing to a decline in food and beverage industry power and influence over fiscal policy (soda taxes) and regulatory policy (sales/advertising restrictions and food labels). This article addresses this issue by exploring why Mexico and Chile eventually saw such a decline in the food and beverage industry's influence, whereas a similar decline did not occur in Brazil. The article argues that in Mexico and Chile, these outcomes are explained by presidential, congressional, and bureaucratic interests shifting to pursue policies that went against industry preferences.
This article took a qualitative methodological approach to comparative historical research.
Policy makers' interest in pursuing stronger food and beverage regulations were shaped by economic and public health concerns, new electoral contexts, epidemiological information, and normative beliefs. In Mexico, the infiltration of nutrition researchers within government facilitated this process. By contrast, Brazil's government was divided about pursuing regulatory policies, with presidents favoring partnerships with industry to implement a popular antihunger program; industry's power endured there with limited progress in policy reforms.
Governments can eventually overcome industry power and policy influence, but it depends on a whole-government commitment to reform.
关于导致食品饮料行业在财政政策（汽水税）和监管政策（销售/广告限制及食品标签）方面的权力和影响力下降的政治、制度和社会背景，我们所知甚少。本文通过探究为何墨西哥和智利最终出现了食品饮料行业影响力的下降，而巴西却未出现类似下降，来解决这一问题。文章认为，在墨西哥和智利，这些结果是由总统、国会和官僚机构的利益转向追求违背行业偏好的政策所导致的。
本文采用定性研究方法进行比较历史研究。
政策制定者对实施更强有力的食品饮料监管政策的兴趣，受到经济和公共卫生担忧、新的选举环境、流行病学信息以及规范性信念的影响。在墨西哥，营养研究人员进入政府推动了这一进程。相比之下，巴西政府在推行监管政策上存在分歧，总统倾向于与行业合作实施一项广受欢迎的反饥饿计划；行业的权力在那里得以延续，政策改革进展有限。
政府最终能够克服行业权力和政策影响，但这取决于整个政府对改革的承诺。
