Haque A S M Ahsan-Ul, Thakur Mugdha, Bielskas Matthew, Marathe Achla, Vullikanti Anil
Biocomplexity Institute, University of Virginia.
Dept of Computer Science, University of Virginia.
Proc AAAI Conf Artif Intell. 2021 May 18;35(6):4812-4820. doi: 10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16613.
Vaccination is the primary intervention for controlling the spread of infectious diseases. A certain level of vaccination rate (referred to as "herd immunity") is needed for this intervention to be effective. However, there are concerns that herd immunity might not be achieved due to an increasing level of hesitancy and opposition to vaccines. One of the primary reasons for this is the cost of non-conformance with one's peers. We use the framework of network coordination games to study the persistence of anti-vaccine sentiment in a population. We extend it to incorporate the opposing forces of the pressure of conforming to peers, herd-immunity and vaccination benefits. We study the structure of the equilibria in such games, and the characteristics of unvaccinated nodes. We also study Stackelberg strategies to reduce the number of nodes with anti-vaccine sentiment. Finally, we evaluate our results on different kinds of real world social networks.
疫苗接种是控制传染病传播的主要干预措施。要使这一干预措施有效，需要达到一定水平的疫苗接种率（称为“群体免疫”）。然而，人们担心由于对疫苗的犹豫和反对情绪不断增加，可能无法实现群体免疫。造成这种情况的一个主要原因是与同龄人不一致的代价。我们使用网络协调博弈的框架来研究人群中反疫苗情绪的持续存在。我们对其进行扩展，纳入了顺应同龄人压力、群体免疫和疫苗接种益处等相反力量。我们研究此类博弈中的均衡结构以及未接种节点的特征。我们还研究了斯塔克尔伯格策略以减少有反疫苗情绪的节点数量。最后，我们在不同类型的现实世界社交网络上评估我们的结果。
