Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths, University of London, Lewisham Way, London, SE14 6NW, England.
Psychol Res. 2024 Nov 12;89(1):4. doi: 10.1007/s00426-024-02047-3.
According to Rosset's dual-process model of intention attribution, our judgements of intentionality can be guided either by an automatic process leading to intentional explanations of behaviour or by a higher-level and cognitively more demanding process enabling unintentional explanations of behaviour. Based on this model, under conditions of compromised cognitive capacity, individuals should judge more behaviour to be intentional rather than unintentional. This prediction was tested in one lab-based experiment and one online experiment. Specifically, we investigated whether increased working memory load would lead to higher intentionality endorsement of ambiguous action when controlling for individual differences in working memory. Results of both experiments indicated no effect of working memory load on intentionality endorsement. The implications of these results for the dual-process model of intention attribution are discussed.
根据罗塞特的意图归因双加工模型，我们对意图的判断可以由一个自动的过程引导，从而对行为做出有意的解释，也可以由一个更高层次、认知要求更高的过程引导，从而对行为做出无意的解释。基于这个模型，在认知能力受损的情况下，个体应该更多地判断行为是有意的而不是无意的。这一预测在一个基于实验室的实验和一个在线实验中得到了检验。具体来说，我们研究了在控制工作记忆个体差异的情况下，增加工作记忆负荷是否会导致对模棱两可行为的更高有意性认可。两个实验的结果都表明工作记忆负荷对有意性认可没有影响。这些结果对意图归因的双加工模型的意义进行了讨论。
