Gleeson Deborah, Scheibner James, Tenni Brigitte Frances, Townsend Belinda, Nicol Dianne
Department of Public Health, School of Psychology and Public Health, La Trobe University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia.
Centre for Social Impact, College of Business Government and Law, Flinders University, Adelaide, SA, Australia.
Int J Health Policy Manag. 2024;13:8589. doi: 10.34172/ijhpm.8589. Epub 2024 Sep 9.
Borges and colleagues rightly argue that an international treaty is needed to curtail the profit-driven behaviour of the pharmaceutical industry during pandemics. The Pandemic Agreement currently being negotiated by Member States of the World Health Organization (WHO) offers an important opportunity to equip nation states with greater leverage over industry behaviour. In this commentary, we examine the potential of current draft textual proposals for the Pandemic Agreement to redirect pharmaceutical behaviour in future pandemics. However, the future of the Agreement negotiations remains uncertain in the wake of the failure to conclude negotiations in time for the 2024 World Health Assembly (WHA). Further, there is limited consensus over proposals that could enable nation states to have greater leverage over industry behaviour. A concerted effort will need to be made to achieve a consensus text that shifts the status quo by giving nation states more power to curtail the self-interest of the pharmaceutical industry.
博尔赫斯及其同事正确地指出，需要一项国际条约来遏制制药行业在大流行期间受利润驱动的行为。世界卫生组织（WHO）成员国目前正在谈判的《大流行协议》提供了一个重要契机，使各国能够对制药行业的行为拥有更大的影响力。在这篇评论中，我们探讨了《大流行协议》当前文本提案草案在未来大流行中引导制药行业行为的潜力。然而，由于未能及时完成谈判以提交给2024年世界卫生大会（WHA），该协议谈判的未来仍不确定。此外，对于能使各国对制药行业行为拥有更大影响力的提案，达成的共识有限。需要共同努力达成一个共识文本，通过赋予各国更多权力来遏制制药行业的私利，从而改变现状。
