Barber Melissa
Yale Law School, Yale School of Medicine, Yale Collaboration for Regulatory Rigor, Integrity, and Transparency, New Haven, Connecticut, United States of America.
PLOS Glob Public Health. 2024 Dec 5;4(12):e0003940. doi: 10.1371/journal.pgph.0003940. eCollection 2024.
Debates over the scope, terms, and governance of technology transfer-the sharing of essential technical information, know-how, and materials needed to manufacture a health product-are prominent and controversial in international health diplomacy. These debates have become focal points in recent contentious negotiations to amend the International Health Regulations (IHR) and draft a global Pandemic Agreement. While some countries advocate for automatic or compulsory mechanisms to facilitate access to health technologies, especially in times of crisis, others oppose legal frameworks that mandate non-voluntary participation by the pharmaceutical industry. Also at stake are questions of institutional mandate: the United States has amplified calls by industry that pandemic technology transfer policy should be the domain of the World Trade Organization (WTO) instead of the World Health Organization (WHO). This essay offers a counternarrative to claims that WHO is overstepping its historic role in global governance. Far from being a contemporary development, technology transfer was at the heart of WHO's work at its founding. WHO's early failure to secure antibiotic technology transfer in the face of US opposition led to its first major crisis, prompting the withdrawal of several member states. In response, WHO embarked in the 1950s on a visionary programme to establish a global network of non-profit, state-run drug manufacturers and scientists committed to the free exchange of knowledge. This ambitious initiative has been largely forgotten, excluded even from WHO's self-published accounts of historical technology transfer work. In the context of ongoing pandemic governance negotiations and the nascent mRNA hub program, remembering the lost vision of global solidarity embodied in WHO's midcentury technology transfer program offers a glimpse into an alternate path we might still chart, one where access to medicines is not bound by the logic of enforcing scarcity to maximize profit, and the right to health is a global responsibility.
关于技术转让的范围、条款和治理——即共享生产健康产品所需的基本技术信息、专有技术和材料——的辩论在国际卫生外交中十分突出且颇具争议。这些辩论已成为近期修订《国际卫生条例》(IHR)和起草全球大流行协议的有争议谈判的焦点。虽然一些国家主张建立自动或强制机制以促进获取卫生技术,尤其是在危机时期,但另一些国家则反对强制制药行业非自愿参与的法律框架。机构职责问题也受到影响:美国响应了制药行业的呼声,称大流行技术转让政策应由世界贸易组织(WTO)而非世界卫生组织(WHO)负责。本文对有关世卫组织在全球治理中越界履行其历史角色的说法提出了不同观点。技术转让并非当代才出现的情况,而是世卫组织创立时工作的核心。由于美国的反对,世卫组织早期未能成功实现抗生素技术转让,导致了其首次重大危机,促使几个成员国退出。作为回应,世卫组织在20世纪50年代启动了一项富有远见的计划,旨在建立一个由致力于知识自由交流的非营利性国营药品制造商和科学家组成的全球网络。这一雄心勃勃的举措在很大程度上已被遗忘,甚至在世卫组织自行发布的历史技术转让工作记录中也未被提及。在当前的大流行治理谈判和新兴的mRNA中心计划背景下,回顾世卫组织世纪中叶技术转让计划中所体现的被遗忘的全球团结愿景,能让我们瞥见一条我们仍可规划的不同道路,一条药品获取不受强化稀缺性以实现利润最大化逻辑束缚、健康权成为全球责任的道路。