Stankozi Caroline
Institute for Philosophy II, Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany.
Front Psychol. 2024 Nov 29;15:1369820. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1369820. eCollection 2024.
Together, ecological psychology and enactivism can explain imagination as being driven by affordance competition. This paper presents synaptic plasticity as a hotspot for the respective historicity. First, (i) affordances are introduced as directly perceptible on the ecological view, and as co-created by an individual on the enactive view. After pointing out their compatibility, (ii) empirical underpinnings of the historicity of affordance competition are summarized and followed by a non-representational interpretation thereof. They are used to explain: (iii) What affords imagining? After discussing both van Dijk and Rietveld's in 2020 non-representational answer and McClelland's in 2020 representational one, I propose a more general explanation: a stand-off between competing affordances can be resolved by imagination, driven by affordance competition. Arguably, (iv) the sensorimotor traces of previous interactions (e.g., strengthened synapses) can be repurposed as representations - grounding even representational explanations in an ecologized enactive framework.
生态心理学和生成认知论共同认为,想象力是由可供性竞争驱动的。本文提出,突触可塑性是各自历史性的一个热点。首先,(i)在生态视角下,可供性被认为是直接可感知的,而在生成认知视角下,可供性是由个体共同创造的。在指出它们的兼容性之后,(ii)总结了可供性竞争历史性的实证基础,并随后对其进行了非表征性解释。这些被用于解释:(iii)什么促成了想象?在讨论了范·迪克和里特维尔德在2020年给出的非表征性答案以及麦克莱兰在2020年给出的表征性答案之后,我提出了一个更普遍的解释:相互竞争的可供性之间的僵持局面可以通过由可供性竞争驱动的想象力来解决。可以说,(iv)先前互动的感觉运动痕迹(例如,强化的突触)可以被重新用作表征——甚至将表征性解释建立在一个生态化的生成认知框架中。