van den Akker Amber, Gilmore Anna B, Fabbri Alice, Knai Cecile, Rutter Harry
Department for Health, University of Bath, Claverton Down, Bath BA2 7AY, UK.
Faculty of Public Health and Policy, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, Keppel St, London WC1E 7HT, UK.
Health Promot Int. 2024 Dec 1;39(6). doi: 10.1093/heapro/daae165.
Global food system governance increasingly relies on multistakeholder initiatives (MSIs) that aim to include those who are affected by and/or affected by an issue. Multistakeholderism's perceived legitimacy is premised on both its outcomes (output legitimacy) and processes (input legitimacy), the latter in turn based on four key rationales: inclusiveness, procedural fairness, consensual orientation and transparency. To date, evidence on the ineffectiveness of MSI's outcomes undermines its claims to output legitimacy. While individual case study assessments have also raised concerns over their processes, documenting instances of power asymmetries and corporate capture, there has hitherto been no comprehensive assessment of the input legitimacy of multistakeholderism. This work addresses that gap through interviews with 31 participants working either in or on MSIs. Participants noted significant challenges related to input legitimacy, including that (i) inclusion was often based on pre-existing networks of an MSI's founders-most of whom were based in the global North-and risked excluding less well-resourced or marginalized actors; (ii) pre-existing power imbalances, both internal and external to the MSI, considerably influenced its processes and structures; (iii) goal-setting was complicated by conflicts of interest and (iv) reliance on informal processes limited transparency. The similarities in challenges across MSIs indicate that these are not attributable to shortcomings of individual MSIs but are instead indicative of wider system constraints. Rather than rely on multistakeholderism as a 'good' governance norm, our findings add to evidence that MSIs do not meet output legitimacy and signal that the legitimacy of MSIs in their current form should be questioned.
全球粮食系统治理越来越依赖于多利益相关方倡议(MSIs),这些倡议旨在纳入那些受某个问题影响和/或对该问题有影响的群体。多利益相关方主义的合法性既基于其成果(产出合法性),也基于其过程(输入合法性),后者又基于四个关键理由:包容性、程序公平性、协商一致导向和透明度。迄今为止,关于多利益相关方倡议成果无效性的证据削弱了其产出合法性的主张。虽然个别案例研究评估也对其过程提出了担忧,记录了权力不对称和企业俘获的情况,但迄今为止,尚未对多利益相关方主义的输入合法性进行全面评估。这项工作通过对31名在多利益相关方倡议内部工作或从事相关工作的参与者进行访谈,填补了这一空白。参与者指出了与输入合法性相关的重大挑战,包括:(i)包容性往往基于多利益相关方倡议创始人预先存在的网络——其中大多数位于全球北方——并有可能排除资源较少或边缘化的行为体;(ii)多利益相关方倡议内部和外部预先存在的权力不平衡,极大地影响了其过程和结构;(iii)利益冲突使目标设定变得复杂;(iv)对非正式过程的依赖限制了透明度。不同多利益相关方倡议面临的挑战具有相似性,这表明这些挑战并非个别多利益相关方倡议的缺点所致,而是更广泛的系统限制的体现。我们的研究结果表明,多利益相关方倡议未能实现产出合法性,不应将多利益相关方主义作为一种“良好”的治理规范,而是表明当前形式的多利益相关方倡议的合法性应受到质疑。