Sato Yukihiro, Kawachi Ichiro, Saijo Yasuaki, Yoshioka Eiji, Osaka Ken, Tabuchi Takahiro
Department of Social Medicine, Asahikawa Medical University, Asahikawa, Hokkaido, Japan.
Department of International and Community Oral Health, Tohoku University Graduate School of Dentistry, Sendai, Miyagi, Japan.
PLoS One. 2024 Dec 30;19(12):e0310673. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0310673. eCollection 2024.
The COVID-19 pandemic was associated with an increase in conspiracy theories worldwide. However, in Japan, the prevalence of COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs has remained unclear. This study aimed to estimate the prevalence and correlates of COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs using a survey of 28,175 residents of Japan aged 16-81 years old.
A cross-sectional self-administered survey was conducted from September to October 2021. To assess the number of COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs, we used three questions from the Oxford Coronavirus Explanations, Attitudes, and Narratives Survey. Independent variables included general vaccine conspiracy beliefs, sociodemographic variables, information sources for COVID-19, trust in authorities, and fear of COVID-19.
After applying sampling weights and imputation, the estimated prevalence of holding at least one COVID-19 conspiracy belief was 24.4%. From a linear regression model, several factors were independently associated with conspiracy beliefs. Notably, people with the lowest level of education (lower secondary school) endorsed fewer COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs (B -0.089, vs. upper secondary school). Furthermore, higher socioeconomic backgrounds-such as higher income, higher wealth, and regular employment-were associated with endorsing conspiracy beliefs. Only 37.3% of respondents trusted the government of Japan, but paradoxically, trust in the government was positively associated with conspiracy beliefs (B 0.175, vs. distrust).
COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs can be prevalent in about a quarter of the residents of Japan. Certain groups are more likely to endorse conspiracy beliefs, and targeting interventions towards these groups might be efficient in stemming the spread of conspiracy beliefs.
新冠疫情在全球范围内引发了阴谋论的增加。然而，在日本，新冠阴谋论的流行程度尚不清楚。本研究旨在通过对28175名年龄在16 - 81岁的日本居民进行调查，来估计新冠阴谋论的流行程度及其相关因素。
于2021年9月至10月进行了一项横断面自填式调查。为评估新冠阴谋论的数量，我们使用了牛津冠状病毒解释、态度和叙事调查中的三个问题。自变量包括一般疫苗阴谋论、社会人口统计学变量、新冠疫情信息来源、对当局的信任以及对新冠的恐惧。
在应用抽样权重和插补法后，估计至少持有一种新冠阴谋论的流行率为24.4%。从线性回归模型来看，有几个因素与阴谋论独立相关。值得注意的是，教育程度最低（初中）的人群认可的新冠阴谋论较少（B -0.089，与高中相比）。此外，较高的社会经济背景，如较高收入、较高财富和稳定就业，与认可阴谋论相关。只有37.3%的受访者信任日本政府，但矛盾的是，对政府的信任与阴谋论呈正相关（B 0.175，与不信任相比）。
新冠阴谋论在约四分之一的日本居民中可能很普遍。某些群体更有可能认可阴谋论，针对这些群体进行干预可能有助于遏制阴谋论的传播。
