De Caro Mario, Bina Federico, Bonicalzi Sofia, Brunetti Riccardo, Croce Michel, Kerusauskaite Skaistė, Navarini Claudia, Ricci Elena, Vaccarezza Maria Silvia
Roma Tre University, Rome, Italy.
Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts, USA.
J Med Philos. 2025 Mar 20;50(2):80-92. doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhae051.
This article defends the centrality of practical wisdom in medical practice by building on a monistic view of moral virtue, termed the "Aretai model," according to which possession of practical wisdom is necessary and sufficient for virtuousness, grounding both moral growth and effective moral behavior. From this perspective, we argue that practical wisdom should be conceived as a cross-situational ethical expertise consisting of four skills:moral perception, moral deliberation, emotion regulation, and moral motivation. Conceiving of practical wisdom as both overall virtuousness and ethical expertise makes it possible to deal adequately with the uniqueness of concrete ethically relevant situations. We contend that this becomes particularly evident in the context of medical practice, both in terms of decision-making and action-taking, especially in the most challenging or contentious clinical cases. We conclude the article by suggesting the potential implications of the Aretai model for continuing education in medical and healthcare professions.
本文通过基于一种被称为“阿瑞泰模型”的道德美德一元论观点，捍卫实践智慧在医疗实践中的核心地位。根据该模型，拥有实践智慧是具备美德的必要且充分条件，它为道德成长和有效的道德行为奠定基础。从这个角度出发，我们认为实践智慧应被视为一种跨情境的伦理专业技能，由四种能力组成：道德感知、道德审议、情绪调节和道德动机。将实践智慧既视为总体的美德又视为伦理专业技能，使得我们能够充分应对具体伦理相关情境的独特性。我们认为，这在医疗实践的背景下，无论是在决策还是行动方面，尤其是在最具挑战性或争议性的临床案例中，都变得尤为明显。我们在文章结尾提出了阿瑞泰模型对医学和医疗保健专业继续教育的潜在影响。
