Johnson Drew
Austin, USA.
Asian J Philos. 2025;4(1):23. doi: 10.1007/s44204-025-00244-4. Epub 2025 Jan 31.
Hinge epistemology is sometimes thought to have controversial relativist and non-evidentialist commitments. This paper develops and motivates an explicitly relativist and radically non-evidentialist version of hinge epistemology, following and combining aspects of Ashton's (2019) defense of relativist hinge epistemology and Pritchard's (2016) defense of a non-epistemic reading of hinge commitments. I argue that radical relativist hinge epistemology shares in a main attraction of hinge epistemology in general, namely, offering a dissolution of closure-based radical skeptical problems. I then motivate RR as a by showing that it is particularly well-suited for fruitful applications in topics such as deep disagreement, testimonial injustice, and hermeneutic injustice.
铰链认识论有时被认为具有有争议的相对主义和非证据主义的承诺。本文发展并推动了一种明确的相对主义和极端非证据主义版本的铰链认识论，它遵循并结合了阿什顿（2019）对相对主义铰链认识论的辩护以及普里查德（2016）对铰链承诺的非认知解读的辩护的各个方面。我认为，极端相对主义铰链认识论总体上与铰链认识论的一个主要吸引力相同，即提供了对基于封闭性的激进怀疑论问题的消解。然后，我通过表明它特别适合在深度分歧、证言不公正和解释学不公正等主题中进行富有成效的应用来推动极端相对主义铰链认识论。
