Kusch Martin
Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna, Universitätsstrasse 7, 1090 Vienna, Austria.
Topoi (Dordr). 2021;40(5):1097-1105. doi: 10.1007/s11245-018-9567-z. Epub 2018 Jun 22.
This paper seeks to widen the dialogue between the "epistemology of peer disagreement" and the epistemology informed by Wittgenstein's last notebooks, later edited as On Certainty. The paper defends the following theses: (i) not all certainties are groundless; many of them are beliefs; and they do not have a common essence. (ii) An epistemic peer need not share all of my certainties. (iii) Which response (steadfast, conciliationist etc.) to a disagreement over a certainty is called for, depends on the type of certainty in question. Sometimes a form of relativism is the right response. (iv) Reasonable, mutually recognized peer disagreement over a certainty is possible.-The paper thus addresses both interpretative and systematic issues. It uses Wittgenstein as a resource for thinking about peer disagreement over certainties.
本文旨在拓展“同行分歧的认识论”与受维特根斯坦最后几本笔记（后编辑为《论确定性》）启发的认识论之间的对话。本文捍卫以下论点：（i）并非所有的确定性都是没有根据的；其中许多是信念；并且它们没有共同的本质。（ii）认知同行不必认同我所有的确定性。（iii）对于关于确定性的分歧需要做出哪种回应（坚定的、调和主义的等），取决于所讨论的确定性的类型。有时某种形式的相对主义是正确的回应。（iv）在确定性问题上存在合理的、相互认可的同行分歧是可能的。——因此，本文既涉及解释性问题，也涉及系统性问题。它将维特根斯坦作为思考关于确定性的同行分歧的一种资源。
