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生态学与通过伙伴选择和互惠实现合作的进化

Ecology and the evolution of cooperation by partner choice and reciprocity.

作者信息

Fuentes Marcelino

机构信息

Department of Biology, University of A Coruña, A Coruña, Spain.

出版信息

Sci Rep. 2025 Feb 7;15(1):4613. doi: 10.1038/s41598-025-87984-8.

DOI:10.1038/s41598-025-87984-8
PMID:39920185
原文链接:https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11805957/
Abstract

Organisms help each other to get resources, protection from enemies, and other goods, but not as much as would be best for their population. Partner choice, direct reciprocity and indirect reciprocity foster cooperation and help to align individual interests with the social good. However, we still do not know what ecological variables affect their success and interaction. I simulated the evolution of partner choice, direct reciprocity and indirect reciprocity, and the production of a good that partners donate to each other. I show that, with few exceptions, partner choice evolves whenever there is an initial social dilemma, under a wider range of conditions than direct reciprocity. Direct reciprocity is deleterious when the shared good is highly essential or very influential. Both partner choice and direct reciprocity compel individuals to produce close to the socially optimal quantity of the shared good. Direct reciprocity does so even when it is deleterious and reciprocators are rare. Indirect reciprocity succeeds when individuals can also choose partners, and in most cases contributes less than partner choice or direct reciprocity to alleviating social dilemmas. Partner choice may have allowed humans to use a set of collectively produced goods including clothing, fire, hunting tools, housing, and shared knowledge, to the point that they became essential.

摘要

生物相互帮助以获取资源、抵御敌人以及获得其他益处,但这种帮助程度并非对其种群最为有利。伙伴选择、直接互惠和间接互惠促进了合作,并有助于使个体利益与社会利益保持一致。然而,我们仍然不知道哪些生态变量会影响它们的成功与相互作用。我模拟了伙伴选择、直接互惠和间接互惠的进化过程,以及伙伴之间相互捐赠的一种益处的产生过程。我发现,除了少数例外情况,只要存在初始的社会困境,在比直接互惠更广泛的条件下,伙伴选择都会进化。当共享的益处至关重要或影响极大时,直接互惠是有害的。伙伴选择和直接互惠都会促使个体生产接近社会最优数量的共享益处。即使直接互惠有害且互惠者很少,它也会如此。当个体也能够选择伙伴时,间接互惠会成功,并且在大多数情况下,它在缓解社会困境方面的作用小于伙伴选择或直接互惠。伙伴选择可能使人类能够利用一系列集体生产的物品,包括衣物、火、狩猎工具、住房和共享知识,直至这些物品变得至关重要。

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Social norms in indirect reciprocity with ternary reputations.具有三元声誉的间接互惠中的社会规范。
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The benefits of being seen to help others: indirect reciprocity and reputation-based partner choice.被视为帮助他人的好处:间接互惠和基于声誉的伴侣选择。
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Nothing better to do? Environment quality and the evolution of cooperation by partner choice.
无所事事?环境质量与通过伙伴选择的合作进化。
J Theor Biol. 2021 Oct 21;527:110805. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2021.110805. Epub 2021 Jun 6.
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A unified framework of direct and indirect reciprocity.直接互惠和间接互惠的统一框架。
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Ten recent insights for our understanding of cooperation.理解合作的十个新视角
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