Li Shaoliang, Zheng Xiazhong, Yan Kesheng, Xue Xinxin
Hubei Key Laboratory of Hydropower Engineering Construction and Management, China Three Gorges University, Yichang, 443002, China.
College of Hydraulic & Environmental Engineering, China Three Gorges University, Yichang, 443002, China.
Sci Rep. 2025 Mar 20;15(1):9582. doi: 10.1038/s41598-025-92853-5.
In recent years, the agent construction system has introduced novel mechanisms for coopetition between Urban Investment and Construction Companies (UICCs) and Real Estate Enterprises (REEs) in China's real estate market. However, the dynamic evolutionary patterns of such interactions remain poorly understood. Under concurrent competition and cooperation, the interplay between UICCs and REEs has grown increasingly complex, involving multidimensional shifts in information transmission and mutual influence, which traditional methodologies struggle to comprehensively capture and analyze. This study constructs a dual-layer heterogeneous network model, integrating prospect theory (PT) and mental accounting (MA) with coopetition game theory, to rigorously analyze multilevel interdependencies between UICCs and REEs. The objective is to uncover evolutionary dynamics of coopetition under the agent construction system and accurately reflect multidimensional interactive behaviors among enterprises. Key findings include: (1) Synergistic enhancements in network connectivity and initial cooperation willingness significantly promote the deep diffusion of cooperative behaviors. However, REEs exhibit greater sensitivity to fluctuations in cooperation willingness compared to UICCs; (2) A nonlinear relationship between agency fees and project premium rates reveals REEs' "preference for independent development" under brand advantages, whereas UICCs demonstrate strong reliance on balanced equity allocation. These conclusions offer managerial implications for governments to refine agent construction policies and for enterprises to formulate dynamic coopetition strategies.
近年来，代建制度在中国房地产市场引入了城市投资建设公司（UICCs）与房地产企业（REEs）之间的新型竞合机制。然而，这种互动的动态演化模式仍知之甚少。在竞争与合作并存的情况下，UICCs与REEs之间的相互作用日益复杂，涉及信息传递和相互影响的多维转变，传统方法难以全面捕捉和分析。本研究构建了一个双层异质网络模型，将前景理论（PT）和心理账户（MA）与竞合博弈理论相结合，以严格分析UICCs与REEs之间的多层次相互依存关系。目的是揭示代建制度下竞合的演化动态，并准确反映企业间的多维互动行为。主要研究结果包括：（1）网络连通性和初始合作意愿的协同增强显著促进了合作行为的深度扩散。然而，与UICCs相比，REEs对合作意愿的波动表现出更高的敏感性；（2）代理费与项目溢价率之间的非线性关系揭示了REEs在品牌优势下的“自主开发偏好”，而UICCs则表现出对平衡股权分配的强烈依赖。这些结论为政府完善代建政策和企业制定动态竞合策略提供了管理启示。
