Guo Bang, Li Yixin, Wang Xinping
Academy of Social Sciences, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong 999077, China.
School of Management, Xi'an University of Science and Technology, Xi'an 710054, China.
Heliyon. 2023 Dec 2;10(1):e23124. doi: 10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e23124. eCollection 2024 Jan 15.
Under the dual-carbon background, coal power enterprises are required to actively fulfill their social responsibility in order to achieve energy saving and emission reduction as soon as possible. Considering the uncertainty of the external environment and the potential conflict of interest of the key stakeholders in the fulfillment of corporate social responsibility, coal power enterprises are not always positive in fulfilling their social responsibility. This paper combines prospect theory and mental account theory with evolutionary game to construct an evolutionary game model involving coal power enterprises, government regulators and the public to study the social responsibility behavior of coal power enterprises. The results of the study show that: (1) The social responsibility behavior of coal power enterprises under the dual-carbon background is a typical cost-driven behavior, and coal power enterprises are more sensitive to costs compared to benefits. (2) The formulation of regulatory policies by government regulators largely depends on the decision inertia of coal power enterprises, and the formulation of regulatory policies by government regulators will also affect the decision inertia of coal power enterprises. (3) The public's strategic choices do not entirely depend on the strategic choices of coal and power enterprises and government regulators, and are more closely related to the setting of the reference point. (4) In addition to the realistic factors, the subjective factors of decision makers are also important factors affecting the fulfillment of social responsibility of coal and power enterprises. Based on the results of the study, this paper proposes countermeasures to enhance the internal driving force of coal power enterprises to fulfill their social responsibility behaviors from the aspects of establishing a communication mechanism, improving the reward and punishment system, and strengthening risk management.
在双碳背景下，要求煤电企业积极履行社会责任，以尽快实现节能减排。考虑到外部环境的不确定性以及企业履行社会责任过程中关键利益相关者潜在的利益冲突，煤电企业在履行社会责任方面并非总是积极主动。本文将前景理论和心理账户理论与演化博弈相结合，构建了一个包含煤电企业、政府监管部门和公众的演化博弈模型，以研究煤电企业的社会责任行为。研究结果表明：（1）双碳背景下煤电企业的社会责任行为是典型的成本驱动行为，与收益相比，煤电企业对成本更为敏感。（2）政府监管部门监管政策的制定很大程度上依赖于煤电企业的决策惯性，且政府监管部门监管政策的制定也会影响煤电企业的决策惯性。（3）公众的策略选择并不完全取决于煤电企业和政府监管部门的策略选择，而是与参照点的设定更为密切相关。（4）除现实因素外，决策者的主观因素也是影响煤电企业履行社会责任的重要因素。基于研究结果，本文从建立沟通机制、完善奖惩制度和强化风险管理等方面提出了增强煤电企业履行社会责任行为内在驱动力的对策。
