Yu Wenfang, Hou Guisheng, He Yu, Xin Baogui
College of Economics and Management, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao, 266590, China.
College of International Exchange, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao, 266590, China.
Heliyon. 2023 Mar 8;9(3):e14348. doi: 10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e14348. eCollection 2023 Mar.
The increasing environmental concerns have changed the coopetition behavior between private-label (PL) retailers and national-brand (NB) manufacturers, which needs firms to reconsider their competitive and cooperative strategies to cope with this change. To address this need, we incorporate carbon trading policy into dynamic coopetition game models between a PL retailer and an NB manufacturer. We examine their dynamic evolution trajectories of state variables, decision variables, and profit value functions by using numerical simulation. The sensitivity analysis shows that: (i) some key parameters affect the steady-state values of variables and profit value functions; (ii) the relative strengths of the NB manufacturer and the PL retailer affect decision variables and profit value functions. The results indicate that the carbon trading policy significantly affects dynamic coopetition between the PL retailer and the NB manufacturer.
日益增长的环境问题改变了自有品牌(PL)零售商与全国性品牌(NB)制造商之间的合作竞争行为,这需要企业重新考虑其竞争与合作策略以应对这一变化。为满足这一需求,我们将碳排放交易政策纳入自有品牌零售商与全国性品牌制造商之间的动态合作竞争博弈模型。我们通过数值模拟研究了它们状态变量、决策变量和利润价值函数的动态演化轨迹。敏感性分析表明:(i)一些关键参数影响变量的稳态值和利润价值函数;(ii)全国性品牌制造商和自有品牌零售商的相对实力影响决策变量和利润价值函数。结果表明,碳排放交易政策显著影响自有品牌零售商与全国性品牌制造商之间的动态合作竞争。