Neck Reinhard, Blueschke Dmitri, Blueschke-Nikolaeva Viktoria
Department of Economics, University of Klagenfurt, Universitätsstrasse 65-67, 9020 Klagenfurt, Austria.
Cent Eur J Oper Res. 2025;33(2):555-569. doi: 10.1007/s10100-025-00978-9. Epub 2025 Mar 31.
In this paper, we modify and extend a model of macroeconomic stabilization policies for a dynamic economy by Leitmann and Wan. We combine a model of long-run output growth and a steady state of no growth with a model of short-run deviations from this growth path based on Keynesian and Monetarist macroeconomic hypotheses. We determine numerically the effects of demand and supply shocks and approximately optimal reactions of fiscal and monetary policies to these shocks for a policy maker in charge of both fiscal and monetary policy using an optimal control algorithm. We also formulate a dynamic game between government (fiscal policy) and central bank (monetary policy) with separate instruments and different preferences for the trade-off between unemployment and inflation and solve it numerically for the noncooperative feedback Nash equilibrium solution and a Pareto optimal solution. The results provide insights into the possibilities of active fiscal and monetary policies and of cooperation and possible conflicts between the institutions responsible for these policies.
在本文中,我们对莱特曼和万提出的动态经济宏观经济稳定政策模型进行了修改和扩展。我们将长期产出增长模型和无增长稳态模型与基于凯恩斯主义和货币主义宏观经济假设的短期偏离该增长路径的模型相结合。我们使用最优控制算法,以数值方式确定需求和供给冲击的影响,以及负责财政和货币政策的政策制定者对这些冲击的近似最优反应。我们还构建了政府(财政政策)和中央银行(货币政策)之间的动态博弈,它们具有不同的工具以及在失业与通胀权衡上的不同偏好,并以数值方式求解非合作反馈纳什均衡解和帕累托最优解。这些结果为积极财政和货币政策的可能性以及负责这些政策的机构之间的合作与可能冲突提供了见解。