Li Lili, Li Yecheng, Lian Jie, Li Mengjie
IEEE Trans Cybern. 2025 Jul;55(7):3251-3261. doi: 10.1109/TCYB.2025.3561686.
This article delves into the security control challenges posed by networked switched systems (NSSs) in the face of deception attacks and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. It takes an active perspective and proposes an enhanced two-tier Stackelberg game approach to influence the actions of the deception attacker, controller, and DoS attacker. By formulating the cost functions for these three participants, it seeks to derive the optimal solution and the interplay between their respective optimal strategies. Meanwhile, two complicated situations are taken into account: The asynchronous behavior between the system and controller is caused by deception attacks tampering with switching signals; The open-loop operation of the system is caused by DoS attacks blocking the output of the controller. In the joint design of the two-tier multiattacker Stackelberg game approach and average dwell time technique, the system's mean square exponential stability is guaranteed while revealing the quantitative relationship between the deception attack, DoS attack, and asynchronous switching behaviors. Finally, a simulation result of a switched RLC circuit confirms the validity of the obtained active security control methodology.
本文深入探讨了网络交换系统（NSS）在面对欺骗攻击和拒绝服务（DoS）攻击时所面临的安全控制挑战。它采取积极的视角，提出了一种增强的两层Stackelberg博弈方法，以影响欺骗攻击者、控制器和DoS攻击者的行动。通过为这三个参与者制定成本函数，试图推导出最优解以及它们各自最优策略之间的相互作用。同时，考虑了两种复杂情况：欺骗攻击篡改切换信号导致系统与控制器之间的异步行为；DoS攻击阻塞控制器输出导致系统的开环运行。在两层多攻击者Stackelberg博弈方法与平均驻留时间技术的联合设计中，保证了系统的均方指数稳定性，同时揭示了欺骗攻击、DoS攻击与异步切换行为之间的定量关系。最后，一个开关RLC电路的仿真结果证实了所获得的主动安全控制方法的有效性。
