Zhao Tong, Hou Qiaoming
School of Management, Shenyang University of Technology, Shenyang, Liaoning, China.
PLoS One. 2025 May 12;20(5):e0320741. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0320741. eCollection 2025.
This study develops a dual-channel supply chain coordination model for services aimed at older adults, taking into account differentiated government subsidies. Utilizing Hotelling and Stackelberg game models, we systematically examine optimal strategies across three distinct scenarios: a non-cooperative mode, cooperation between online channels and logistics suppliers, and a tripartite collaboration involving both online and offline channels alongside logistics suppliers. The results demonstrate that the optimal pricing and service levels attained in cooperative scenarios exceed those observed in non-cooperative settings. Furthermore, within the framework of tripartite collaboration, the influence of enhanced service levels on the optimization of both service pricing and quality is particularly significant. It is noteworthy that government subsidies tend to exert a marginally greater incentive effect on offline service channels compared to online ones, thereby increasing the focus on addressing the emotional needs of older adults. Overall, this research represents a pioneering effort to compare these three service cooperation models, leveraging government subsidies as a catalyst. It not only enhances the advantages of differentiated dual-channel services but also promotes the efficient allocation of resources in elder care through the identification of suitable collaborative strategies.
本研究针对面向老年人的服务构建了一个考虑差异化政府补贴的双通道供应链协调模型。利用霍特林模型和斯塔克尔伯格博弈模型,我们系统地考察了三种不同情景下的最优策略:非合作模式、在线渠道与物流供应商之间的合作,以及在线和线下渠道与物流供应商的三方协作。结果表明,合作情景下实现的最优定价和服务水平超过了非合作情景。此外,在三方协作框架内,提高服务水平对服务定价和质量优化的影响尤为显著。值得注意的是,与在线渠道相比,政府补贴对线下服务渠道的激励作用往往略大,从而增加了对满足老年人情感需求的关注。总体而言,本研究是一项开创性的工作,以政府补贴为催化剂比较这三种服务合作模式。它不仅增强了差异化双通道服务的优势,还通过识别合适的协作策略促进了老年护理资源的有效配置。