Faculty of Management and Economics, Kunming University of Science and Technology, Kunming 650504, China.
School of Economics and Management, Huzhou University, Huzhou 313000, China.
Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2022 May 9;19(9):5778. doi: 10.3390/ijerph19095778.
Privacy and information protection are important issues in the era of big data. At present, China's elderly care industry is gradually adopting the supply model of smart elderly care to alleviate the contradiction between supply and demand. However, the low level of regulation of smart aging platforms may lead to a low level of privacy protection on the platforms. Therefore, in this paper, based on the evolutionary game and Lyapunov theory, we discuss the willingness of elderly people to participate in regulation, the privacy protection status of platform service providers, and the degree of government regulation, as well as the key factors affecting the equilibrium of the three-party game system, and conduct simulation analysis and game system optimization using MATLAB. The simulation results show that A1(0,0,1) and A5(0,0,0) can be transformed to A8(1,1,0) by adjusting the parameters, i.e., the optimal ESS is participation, high-quality protection, and low investment supervision; the service income of the elderly, the loss of privacy leakage, the investment cost of service providers, and the amount of government rewards and punishments are the key factors affecting the tripartite game system. By analyzing the impact of factors, such as benefits and costs, on privacy protection and the regulation of smart senior care platforms, the level of privacy protection of smart senior care platforms can be improved and the process of the comprehensive regulation of domestic senior care services can be promoted.
隐私和信息保护是大数据时代的重要问题。目前，中国的养老产业逐渐采用智慧养老的供应模式，以缓解供需矛盾。然而，智慧养老平台的低监管水平可能导致平台上的隐私保护水平较低。因此，本文基于进化博弈和 Lyapunov 理论，讨论了老年人参与监管的意愿、平台服务提供商的隐私保护状况以及政府监管的程度，以及影响三方博弈系统均衡的关键因素，并使用 MATLAB 进行了仿真分析和游戏系统优化。仿真结果表明，通过调整参数，A1(0,0,1)和 A5(0,0,0)可以转变为 A8(1,1,0)，即最优 ESS 是参与、高质量保护和低投资监管；老年人的服务收入、隐私泄露的损失、服务提供商的投资成本以及政府奖惩的数额是影响三方博弈系统的关键因素。通过分析利益和成本等因素对智慧养老平台隐私保护和监管的影响，可以提高智慧养老平台的隐私保护水平，促进国内养老服务的全面监管进程。
