Ali Hager
GIGA Institute for Middle East Studies, German Institute for Global and Area Studies, Neuer Jungfernstieg 21, 20354 Hamburg, Germany.
Z Vgl Polit. 2022;16(3):483-503. doi: 10.1007/s12286-023-00561-z. Epub 2023 Mar 8.
Tunisia's political system suffers from recurrent problems with governability and proportionality. A volatile party landscape, frequent cabinet reshuffles, and political gridlocks repeatedly jeopardized stability and democratic progress since the Arab Spring. Major and minor electoral reforms were undertaken in 2014, 2017, 2019, and 2022, but they were unable to diffuse either of these issues. This analysis is therefore driven by two central questions: How have Tunisia's electoral laws changed since the Arab Spring? And why have these reforms failed to improve both governability and proportionality? It will be argued that because Tunisia's party landscape is fractured and volatile only on the secularist side of the spectrum, coalitions with and against Ennahda are costly to all parties involved, worsening the overall quality of political representation. By analyzing the trajectory of major and minor electoral reforms longitudinally, this paper finds that Tunisia's electoral reforms incrementally restricted the electoral system by limiting parties' and candidates' capacity to compete in elections. Through modifying legislation on campaign finance and subsidies, gender parity, and candidacy requirements, and finally abolishing Tunisia's closed list PR-system in 2022, reforms benefit established older parties and wealthier candidates while fortifying the electoral system against newer and less wealthy contenders. Tunisia's electoral reforms are inadequate in addressing governability and proportionality because restricting electoral competition alone cannot improve the quality of representation through political parties.
突尼斯的政治制度长期存在治理和比例代表制方面的问题。自阿拉伯之春以来,政党格局动荡不安,内阁频繁改组,政治僵局屡屡危及稳定和民主进程。2014年、2017年、2019年和2022年进行了大大小小的选举改革,但这些改革未能解决上述任何一个问题。因此,本分析由两个核心问题驱动:自阿拉伯之春以来,突尼斯的选举法有何变化?以及为什么这些改革未能改善治理和比例代表制?本文认为,由于突尼斯的政党格局仅在世俗主义阵营中分裂且动荡,与复兴党结盟和对抗复兴党的联盟对所有相关政党来说成本都很高,这恶化了政治代表的整体质量。通过纵向分析大大小小的选举改革轨迹,本文发现突尼斯的选举改革通过限制政党和候选人的选举竞争能力,逐步限制了选举制度。通过修改竞选资金和补贴、性别平等以及候选人资格要求的立法,最终在2022年废除突尼斯的封闭名单比例代表制,改革有利于老牌政党和较富有的候选人,同时加强选举制度以抵御新的和较不富裕的竞争者。突尼斯的选举改革在解决治理和比例代表制方面是不够的,因为仅限制选举竞争并不能通过政党提高代表质量。