Greene Daniel, Relman David A, Palmer Megan J
Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, Stanford, California, USA.
Deloitte Consulting LLP, New York, New York, USA.
Appl Biosaf. 2025 Jun 5;30(2):112-123. doi: 10.1089/apb.2024.0052. eCollection 2025 Jun.
United States and global guidance documents and codes of conduct urge life scientists to practice a "culture of responsibility" by proactively managing the potential biosafety, biosecurity, and dual-use information risks of their work. However, research suggests that many life scientists are unfamiliar with or disengaged from aspects of biorisk management. To better understand life scientists' beliefs and attitudes about biorisk management, we conducted a survey with 127 researchers at a prestigious U.S. university who directly manipulate DNA or RNA in living organisms, cells, and/or viruses. We found that while participants were broadly positive about their efforts to address risks and expressed a sense of responsibility to do so, most failed to meet the expectations that they hold for how often a typical scientist in their research community should consider biosafety, biosecurity, or dual-use information risks. Faculty were more likely to meet their expectations than non-faculty, and all participants were more likely to meet their expectations considering biosafety risks compared with biosecurity or dual-use information risks. Most non-faculty said that they have "never or almost never" considered the risk of deliberate misuse or information release with their lab. Outside of mandatory biosafety training, few had received formal education about biorisks or discussed them at lab meetings. Career incentives and the logistical burdens of biorisk management were noted as reasons for disengagement. Our results suggest that by their own standards, U.S. life scientists have significant room for improvement in their capacity for proactive biorisk management, particularly regarding biosecurity and dual-use information risks.
美国和全球的指导文件及行为准则敦促生命科学家通过积极管理其工作中潜在的生物安全、生物安保和两用信息风险来践行“责任文化”。然而,研究表明,许多生命科学家对生物风险管理的各个方面并不熟悉或未积极参与。为了更好地了解生命科学家对生物风险管理的信念和态度,我们对美国一所著名大学的127名研究人员进行了一项调查,这些研究人员直接在生物体、细胞和/或病毒中操作DNA或RNA。我们发现,虽然参与者对他们应对风险的努力普遍持积极态度,并表达了这样做的责任感,但大多数人未能达到他们对所在研究领域典型科学家应考虑生物安全、生物安保或两用信息风险的频率的期望。与非教师相比,教师更有可能达到他们的期望,并且与生物安保或两用信息风险相比,所有参与者在考虑生物安全风险时更有可能达到他们的期望。大多数非教师表示,他们“从未或几乎从未”考虑过其实验室存在的故意滥用或信息泄露风险。除了强制性的生物安全培训外,很少有人接受过关于生物风险的正规教育,也很少在实验室会议上讨论这些风险。职业激励措施和生物风险管理的后勤负担被认为是参与度不高的原因。我们的结果表明,按照他们自己的标准,美国生命科学家在主动生物风险管理能力方面有很大的改进空间,特别是在生物安保和两用信息风险方面。