Frömer Romy, Callaway Frederick, Griffiths Thomas L, Shenhav Amitai
Cognitive, Linguistic and Psychological Sciences, Brown University, Providence, RI, USA.
School of Psychology, Centre for Human Brain Health, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK.
Open Mind (Camb). 2025 Jun 25;9:791-813. doi: 10.1162/opmi.a.3. eCollection 2025.
When making decisions, we often have more information about some options than others. Previous work has shown that people are more likely to choose options that they look at more and those that they are more confident in. But should one always prefer options one knows more about? Intuition suggests not. Rather, how additional information impacts our preferences should depend critically on how valuable we expect the options to be. Here, we formalize this intuition in a Bayesian sequential sampling model where attention and confidence influence the precision of momentary evidence. Our model makes a key prediction: attention and confidence both increase choice probability for better-than-average options, and both decrease choice probability for worse-than-average options. We confirm this prediction in two experiments in which we independently manipulate value and attention. Our results offer a novel perspective on prior work on the role of attention and confidence in decision-making, showing that people rely on contextual knowledge and uncertainty estimates to adaptively learn about their options and make better decisions.
在做决策时,我们对某些选项的信息了解往往比其他选项更多。先前的研究表明,人们更有可能选择那些他们看得更多以及更有信心的选项。但人们是否应该总是偏好那些自己了解更多的选项呢?直觉告诉我们并非如此。相反,额外信息如何影响我们的偏好应该主要取决于我们对这些选项价值的预期。在此,我们在一个贝叶斯序贯抽样模型中形式化了这种直觉,在该模型中注意力和信心会影响瞬时证据的精度。我们的模型做出了一个关键预测:注意力和信心都会增加优于平均水平选项的选择概率,同时都会降低低于平均水平选项的选择概率。我们在两个实验中证实了这一预测,在实验中我们分别操控了价值和注意力。我们的结果为先前关于注意力和信心在决策中作用的研究提供了一个新视角,表明人们依靠情境知识和不确定性估计来适应性地了解他们的选项并做出更好的决策。