Huang Liwen, Yu Liangxing, Huang Wei
School of Business, Jishou University, Jishou, China.
PLoS One. 2025 Sep 3;20(9):e0330709. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0330709. eCollection 2025.
From the perspective of interest conflicts, this study investigates the relationship between corporate leverage manipulation and financial risk using a sample of A-share listed real estate firms in China from 2009 to 2023. Employing a two-way fixed effects model, the main findings are as follows: (1) Leverage manipulation significantly increases the level of financial risk among real estate firms; (2) Mechanism analysis reveals a collusion effect between controlling shareholders and management, as well as between external auditors and management, both of which significantly amplify the impact of leverage manipulation on financial risk. These findings support the collusion effect hypothesis and reject the monitoring effect hypothesis; (3) Heterogeneity tests show that the impact of leverage manipulation on financial risk is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises, in firms dominated by transactional institutional investors, and in regions with lower reliance on land finance. This study uncovers the intrinsic link between leverage manipulation and financial risk in the real estate sector and provides important policy implications for regulators aiming to improve and standardize financial risk management in the industry.
从利益冲突的角度出发，本研究以2009年至2023年中国A股上市房地产企业为样本，考察了企业杠杆操纵与财务风险之间的关系。采用双向固定效应模型，主要研究结果如下：（1）杠杆操纵显著提高了房地产企业的财务风险水平；（2）机制分析揭示了控股股东与管理层之间以及外部审计师与管理层之间的合谋效应，这两者均显著放大了杠杆操纵对财务风险的影响。这些发现支持合谋效应假说，拒绝监督效应假说；（3）异质性检验表明，杠杆操纵对财务风险的影响在非国有企业、以交易性机构投资者为主的企业以及对土地财政依赖程度较低的地区更为显著。本研究揭示了房地产行业杠杆操纵与财务风险之间的内在联系，并为旨在改善和规范该行业金融风险管理的监管机构提供了重要的政策启示。
