Preston S H
Demography. 1984 Nov;21(4):435-57.
Let me summarize briefly. My argument is that we have made a set of private and public choices that have dramatically altered the age profile of well-being. These choices are in an important sense joint ones involving the number of dependents we have as well as the conditions in which they live. This jointness derives from several sources. One is that the same institution--the conjugal family--remains the principal agent responsible for both childbearing and childrearing. Factors that influence the health of that institution invariably affect both numbers of and conditions for children. There was simply no way to protect children fully from the earthquake that shuddered through the American family in the past 20 years. The factors at work here are not only the objective conditions we face but also the set of values and mental constructs we elect to face them with. At the other end of the age scale, we can obviously affect the number of elderly persons as well as their circumstances by altering health programs, as we have so decisively chosen to do. A final source of jointness is that numbers themselves affect conditions. Some of these effects are largely inadvertent, as I've argued in regard to public schooling, and others seem to be very deliberate outcomes of the political process. It's useful to step back and ask whether the mixture of numbers and conditions that we've chosen is the one that best serves us. In regard to redistributions from the working-age population to the elderly, the answer is far from obvious. There is surely something to be said for a system in which things get better as we pass through life rather than worse. The great levelling off of age curves of psychological distress, suicide and income in the past two decades might simply reflect the fact that we have decided in some fundamental sense that we don't want to face futures that become continually bleaker. But let's be clear that the transfers from the working-age population to the elderly are also transfers away from children, since the working ages bear far more responsibility for childrearing than do the elderly. And let's also recognize that the sums involved are huge. Just the increase in federal expenditures on the elderly between 1977 and 1983, if distributed among the population under age 15, would come to well over $2,000 per child.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)
让我简要总结一下。我的观点是,我们做出了一系列个人和公共选择,这些选择极大地改变了幸福的年龄分布状况。从重要意义上讲,这些选择是相互关联的,涉及我们所抚养的人数以及他们的生活条件。这种关联性源于多个方面。其一,同一个机构——婚姻家庭——仍然是生育和养育子女的主要责任主体。影响该机构健康状况的因素必然会对子女数量和养育条件产生影响。在过去20年里,根本无法让孩子们完全免受震撼美国家庭的那场“地震”的影响。这里起作用的因素不仅包括我们所面临的客观条件,还包括我们用以面对这些条件的一系列价值观和思维模式。在年龄分布的另一端,显然我们可以通过改变健康计划来影响老年人的数量及其生活状况,就像我们已经果断选择去做的那样。关联性的最后一个来源是数量本身会影响条件。其中一些影响在很大程度上是无意的,就像我在公立教育方面所论述的那样,而其他一些似乎是政治进程非常刻意的结果。退一步问问我们所选择的数量与条件的组合是否是最有利于我们的,这很有必要。关于从劳动年龄人口向老年人的再分配,答案远非显而易见。对于一个随着我们度过一生情况会变好而非变差的体系,肯定是有道理可言的。过去二十年里心理困扰、自杀和收入的年龄曲线大幅趋平,这可能仅仅反映了一个事实,即在某种根本意义上,我们决定不想面对未来变得越来越黯淡的情况。但要明确的是,从劳动年龄人口向老年人的转移也是从儿童那里的转移,因为劳动年龄人群在养育子女方面承担的责任远比老年人多。同时也要认识到,所涉及的金额巨大。仅1977年至1983年期间联邦政府在老年人身上支出的增加额,如果分摊到15岁以下人口身上,每个孩子将超过2000美元。(摘要截选至250词)