Specious causal attributions in the social sciences: the reformulated stepping-stone theory of heroin use as exemplar.

The claims based on causal models employing either statistical or experimental controls are examined and found to be excessive when applied to social or behavioral science data. An exemplary case, in which strong causal claims are made on the basis of a weak version of the regularity model of cause, is critiqued. O'Donnell and Clayton claim that in order to establish that marijuana use is a cause of heroin use (their "reformulated stepping-stone" hypothesis), it is necessary and sufficient to demonstrate that marijuana use precedes heroin use and that the statistically significant association between the two does not vanish when the effects of other variables deemed to be prior to both of them are removed. I argue that O'Donnell and Clayton's version of the regularity model is not sufficient to establish cause and that the planning of social interventions both presumes and requires a generative rather than a regularity causal model. Causal modeling using statistical controls is of value when it compels the investigator to make explicit and to justify a causal explanation but not when it is offered as a substitute for a generative analysis of causal connection.