Wyschogrod E
J Med Philos. 1981 Feb;6(1):25-43. doi: 10.1093/jmp/6.1.25.
Empathy and sympathy are feeling-acts which bring the self into direct encounter with other persons. In empathy a self grasps the affective act of another self; in sympathy xn persons apprehend a common object while immersed in similar feeling acts. Since touch is the paradigmatic sense for bringing what is felt into proximity with feeling, structural affinities between touch and these feeling acts can be shown. This relationship has been obscured by classical theories of touch in which it is interpreted on analogy with the other senses. When the subject of touch is seen as the living body in a whole, the full range of its possible relationships to affective states can be explored. In this connection the theories of touch of Aristotle, Berkeley and Condillac are critically evaluated. While none recognizes the uniqueness of touch, each sees difficulties in incorporating touch in a general theory of sense. In the course of the exposition pity is distinguished from empathy and sympathy and a criticism of Nietzsche's ressentiment theory offered.
共情和同情是使自我与他人直接接触的情感行为。在共情中，一个自我领会另一个自我的情感行为；在同情中，人们在沉浸于相似情感行为时领会一个共同的对象。由于触觉是使所感受之物与感受接近的典型感官，所以可以表明触觉与这些情感行为之间的结构相似性。这种关系被经典的触觉理论所遮蔽，在这些理论中，触觉是按照与其他感官的类比来解释的。当将触觉的主体视为一个整体的活体时，就可以探究其与情感状态的全部可能关系。在这方面，对亚里士多德、贝克莱和孔狄亚克的触觉理论进行了批判性评估。虽然没有人认识到触觉的独特性，但每个人都看到将触觉纳入一般感官理论存在困难。在阐述过程中，怜悯与共情和同情被区分开来，并对尼采的怨恨理论提出了批评。
