Lea R B
Department of Psychology, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, USA.
J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn. 1995 Nov;21(6):1469-82. doi: 10.1037//0278-7393.21.6.1469.
A model of propositional-logic reasoning proposed by M. D. S. Braine, B. J. Reiser, and B. Rumain (1984) claims that inferences such as "p or q; not p/therefore q" are made spontaneously by readers at the moment both premises are available. This claim is inconsistent with some evidence in the text-processing literature that suggests that only those inferences necessary for textual coherence are made spontaneously. In the present study, participants read stories in which a logical inference was not necessary to maintain textual coherence, and inference making was assessed with on-line probes. Two experiments tested logical forms central to Braine et al.'s model, and both indicated that participants were making the logical inferences. Two further experiments replicated this result with stories that did not begin with thematic titles. These findings support Braine et al.'s prediction that some propositional-logic inferences are made routinely in texts that do not require them for coherence.
M. D. S. 布雷恩、B. J. 赖泽尔和B. 鲁曼(1984年)提出的命题逻辑推理模型声称,诸如“p或q;非p/所以q”这样的推理,在两个前提都可用时,读者会自发做出。这一说法与文本处理文献中的一些证据不一致,这些证据表明,只有那些对文本连贯性必不可少的推理才会自发做出。在本研究中,参与者阅读的故事中,逻辑推理对于保持文本连贯性并非必要,并且通过在线探测来评估推理过程。两项实验测试了布雷恩等人模型的核心逻辑形式,结果都表明参与者在进行逻辑推理。另外两项实验用没有主题标题开头的故事重复了这一结果。这些发现支持了布雷恩等人的预测,即在不需要命题逻辑推理来保持连贯性的文本中,一些命题逻辑推理仍会常规性地出现。