Molinari C, Morlock L, Alexander J, Lyles C A
Division of Health Administration, Department of Health Services, University of Kentucky, Lexington 40536-0080.
Health Serv Res. 1993 Aug;28(3):358-77.
Two theories--agency and managerialism--are compared with respect to their usefulness in explaining the role of insiders on the hospital board: whether their participation enhances or impairs board financial decision making.
DATA SOURCES/STUDY SETTING: The study used 1985 hospital financial and governing board data for a representative sample of acute care California hospitals.
Relationships were examined cross-sectionally between the presence or absence of insiders on the board and measures of hospital financial viability while controlling for the organizational factors of system affiliation, ownership, size, region, and corporate restructuring.
Multiple regression analysis found significant relationships between insider (CEO, medical staff) participation and hospital viability.
These results support the managerial theory of governance by suggesting that the CEO and medical staff provide informational advantages to the hospital governing board. However, the cross-sectional design points to the need for future longitudinal studies in order to sequence these relationships between insider participation and improved hospital viability.
比较委托代理理论和管理主义理论在解释内部人员在医院董事会中所起作用方面的有效性,即他们的参与是增强还是损害董事会的财务决策。
数据来源/研究背景:该研究使用了1985年加利福尼亚州急性护理医院代表性样本的医院财务和管理委员会数据。
在控制系统隶属关系、所有权、规模、地区和公司重组等组织因素的同时,对董事会内部人员的有无与医院财务生存能力指标进行横断面关系研究。
多元回归分析发现内部人员(首席执行官、医务人员)的参与与医院生存能力之间存在显著关系。
这些结果支持治理的管理理论,表明首席执行官和医务人员为医院管理委员会提供了信息优势。然而,横断面设计表明未来需要进行纵向研究,以便梳理内部人员参与和医院生存能力提高之间的这些关系。