McIntosh D
J Am Psychoanal Assoc. 1993;41(3):679-709. doi: 10.1177/000306519304100303.
This paper reexamines Freud's theory of "cathexis" (a quantity of motivational intensity invested in an object) in the light of recent developments in philosophy and cognitive psychology. Contrary to what is often thought, the quantitative element is defensible as a purely psychological idea. The notion of a cathexis is closely similar to the philosophical idea of an "intentional" state, which derives from Franz Brentano, Freud's teacher and mentor. Freud initially held the object of a cathexis always to be intrapsychic, a position which is untenable and which he largely abandoned after 1915, when he began (correctly) to take cathected objects generally to be persons or events, not their representations. His idea of a cathexis as "entering into" its object contains a valuable and neglected insight, which undermines the centrality of the distinction between the "outer" and "inner" realms of experience. This distinction should not be confused with the key distinction between "fantasy" and "actuality" with respect to cathectic objects. So-called "inner" (fantasy) objects are generally "inside" the mind in a metaphorical sense only.
本文根据哲学和认知心理学的最新发展，重新审视了弗洛伊德的“贯注”理论（一种投入到某个对象上的动机强度量）。与通常的看法相反，作为一种纯粹的心理学概念，定量因素是站得住脚的。“贯注”概念与源自弗洛伊德的老师兼导师弗兰兹·布伦塔诺的“意向性”状态这一哲学概念极为相似。弗洛伊德最初认为，贯注的对象始终是心理内部的，这一立场是站不住脚的，1915年之后他在很大程度上放弃了这一立场，当时他开始（正确地）普遍将被贯注的对象视为人物或事件，而非它们的表征。他关于贯注“进入”其对象的观点包含了一个有价值但被忽视的见解，这一见解削弱了经验的“外部”和“内部”领域之间区分的核心地位。这种区分不应与关于贯注对象的“幻想”和“现实”之间的关键区分相混淆。所谓的“内部”（幻想）对象通常只是在隐喻意义上存在于“心灵内部”。
