Natsoulas T
Department of Psychology, University of California, Davis 95616-8686.
Psychol Res. 1993;55(3):248-57. doi: 10.1007/BF00419611.
Gibson's theory nearly explicitly distinguishes the activity or process of perceiving from its component stream of perceptual experience (awareness). An activity of perceiving is a total process of a perceiver's using a perceptual system to perceive something in the environment or of himself or herself in that environment. An activity of perceiving includes, inter alia, an obtained stimulus energy flux at the respective receptors, as well as a stream of perceptual experience (awareness) which proceeds at certain brain centers of the respective perceptual system. Obtaining stimulation, though this be highly structured and nomically specific to environmental properties, is not the having of perceptual experience (awareness); in addition to information pick-up, there must take place, in the nervous system, extraction of informational features (invariants and variants) of the stimulus energy flux. But the Gibsonian Lombardo argues that perceptual awareness is not a brain process; it occurs, rather, at the ecological level of organization. In effect, this contradicts Gibson's theory, which holds (a) that information pick-up, but not extraction, occurs at the interface between perceiving and environment, and (b) perceptual experience (awareness), in contrast to perceiving, is not publicly observable, as it would be by definition if it occurred at the ecological level of organization.
吉布森的理论几乎明确地区分了感知活动或过程与其感知体验(意识)的组成流。感知活动是感知者使用感知系统感知环境中的某物或其自身在该环境中的全部过程。感知活动尤其包括在各个感受器处获得的刺激能量流,以及在各个感知系统的某些脑中心进行的感知体验(意识)流。获得刺激,尽管这种刺激高度结构化且在法则上特定于环境属性,但这并非拥有感知体验(意识);除了信息采集之外,在神经系统中还必须对刺激能量流的信息特征(不变量和变量)进行提取。但是吉布森学派的隆巴多认为,感知意识不是一个脑过程;相反,它发生在生态组织层面。实际上,这与吉布森的理论相矛盾,吉布森的理论认为:(a)信息采集而非提取发生在感知与环境的界面处;(b)与感知不同,感知体验(意识)不是可公开观察到的,而如果它发生在生态组织层面,根据定义它应该是可公开观察到的。