Comments on the crusade against the causal efficacy of human thought.

Hawkins reiterates the familiar behavioristic doctrine that psychology should banish factors that cannot be directly observed. He seems to be unaware that the very operant theory he is espousing is heavily invested in internal determinants that do not lend themselves to direct observation. Because behavior is often unaffected by its immediate situational antecedents and consequences, operant analysts are turning increasingly to internalized determinants of behavior, such as the residues of past reinforcements. These internalized determinants are not directly observable or measurable. They are inferred organismic states. Hawkins invokes the standard behavioristic arguments that, like other cognitive events, beliefs of personal efficacy are epiphenomenal by-products of conditioned responses. The paradigms used to verify the causal contribution of efficacy beliefs to performance renders this claim empirically baseless. Efficacy beliefs are systematically raised to differential levels by means that involve no performances or by bogus feedback that is either unrelated to performance or is contrary to performance. In none of these paradigms are instated efficacy beliefs reflections of performance, but they are uniformly good predictors of subsequent performance. Epiphenomenal assertions are self-destruct arguments.