Frean M
Department of Computer Science, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand.
J Theor Biol. 1996 Oct 21;182(4):549-59. doi: 10.1006/jtbi.1996.0194.
The Prisoner's Dilemma has been widely studied as a model for the evolution of cooperation, and most of this work has dealt with agents who either cooperate or not. In this paper we look at the consequences of allowing agents to have intermediate levels of cooperation, and to update these levels over time. The familiar strategy of "tit for tat" emerges as a robust mode of behaviour, yet there are important differences between this case and that of "all or nothing" cooperation.
囚徒困境作为合作进化的模型已得到广泛研究，并且大部分此类研究都涉及要么合作要么不合作的主体。在本文中，我们研究了允许主体具有中间合作水平并随时间更新这些水平的后果。常见的“以牙还牙”策略成为一种稳健的行为模式，但这种情况与“全有或全无”合作的情况存在重要差异。
